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The Marine Corps manpower system has the responsibility of ensuring that the 
appropriate numbers of trained and experienced Marines are assigned to commanders to 
perform their missions.  The main concern with the current manpower system is that 
there are many skills that are critically short while others exceed requirements.  The 
questions that are addressed in this thesis are, “can and should the Marine Corps 
promotion system be restructured, redesigned, or replaced to fulfill the objective of 
properly structuring the force,” and “what would be the policy implications, unintended 
consequences, and pros and cons of promoting officers by MOS?” The authors explored 
the issue by first taking a detailed look at the history, statutory basis, and operation of the 
Marine Corps officer promotion system.  The authors then examined the history, statutory 
basis, and operations of the officer promotion systems of the Navy, Army and Air Force 
to understand if their promotion systems were engineered to deal with force structuring 
concerns.  The authors conclude the thesis by discussing why restructuring the Marine 
Corps officer promotion system would not be the best alternative for the Marine Corps 
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I. REENGINEERING THE MARINE CORPS PROMOTION 
SYSTEM 
The Marine Corps manpower system has the responsibility of ensuring that the 
appropriate number of trained and experienced Marines are assigned to commanders to 
perform their missions.  The Marine Corps Officer promotion system is one aspect of the 
Marine Corps manpower system and is designed to select officers for promotion based on 
their potential to carry out the duties and responsibilities of the next higher grade.   
The Marine Corps promotes individuals on an aggregate basis, and the individuals 
who are promoted are the best Marine Officers, but they do not necessarily match the 
requirements needed to support the billet structure as listed in the Authorized Strength 
Report (ASR) and Grade Adjusted Recapitulation (GAR).  The current promotion system 
is therefore limited in the manner in which it can be utilized to properly structure the 
organization according to grade and Primary Military Occupational Specialty (PMOS). 
A. PROBLEM 
The main concern with the current manpower system is that we have many skills 
that are critically short while others are well over.1  The promotion system as currently 
designed only exacerbates this problem because officer promotions are tied to the 
aggregate vacancies and not the current force structure requirements.  
The underlying questions that must be answered in this thesis are, “can and should 
the Marine Corps promotion system be restructured, redesigned, or replaced to fulfill the 
objective of properly structuring the force,” and “what would be the policy implications, 
unintended consequences, and pros and cons of promoting officers by MOS?” 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The approach to answering the key research question involves documenting the 
problem, analyzing the promotion process of similar organizations, and recommending 
solutions. 
To document the problem the authors conducted a thorough review of the current 
Marine Corps promotion process, which included the history and statutory regulations 
                                                 
1 Wielsma Ronald J. Our Manpower Dilemma. Marine Corps Gazette. Quantico VA. Mar 2001, p. 40. 
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that effect the process.  The authors compared the MOS status report from 1997 to 2001 
with the MOS onboard strength reports and the promotion by MOS reports during those 
same years to determine how well billet vacancies were filled using the “best and most 
qualified” standard.  
The authors interviewed key officers at promotion planning branches of the Navy, 
Army, and Air Force and reviewed available doctrine to analyze their respective 
promotion systems for their ability/inability to address force structure requirements.  The 
authors then determined which aspects of their systems could potentially be beneficial for 
the Marine Corps to implement.  Finally, the authors provided recommendations on 
restructuring the Marine Corps promotion process as well as advantages, disadvantages, 
and unintended consequences of restructuring the process. 
C. THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis is structured into three phases.  The first phase, which is accomplished 
in chapter one, has three parts.  The first part details the manpower context in which the 
promotion process operates.  The second part addresses the question of why the Marine 
Corps would consider reengineering a promotion system that is statistically successful in 
achieving its stated goals, and the third part provides a history of previous force-
structuring tools that have been employed in the Marine Corps.  Upon completion of 
chapter one the reader will understand why it would be necessary to use the promotion 
process as a force-structuring tool.  
The second phase of the thesis, which is accomplished in chapters two through 
five, entails an in-depth review of the promotion processes of the four branches of 
military service.  This review will provide the reader a detailed understanding of how the 
varied promotion processes were framed and how they operate to increase the efficiency 
of their services.  The final phase of this thesis describes the authors’ conclusions about 
using the promotion process as a force-structuring tool. 
D. THE MARINE CORPS MANPOWER PROCESS 
To understand the Marine Corps promotion process, it is important to have a 
general understanding of the Marine Corps manpower process.  To elaborate on this 
process, the authors conducted several interviews with key officers at Marine Corps 
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Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and Manpower and Reserve Affairs 
(M&RA). 
1. Manpower Objectives 
The objective of the manpower process is to provide the appropriate number of 
trained and experienced Marines to perform the mission of the Corps.  Central to the 
manpower system are three interdependent agencies:  Marine Corps Recruiting 
Command, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and Manpower and Reserve 
Affairs.2  
The mission of Marine Corps Recruiting Command is to conduct integrated 
recruiting operations in order to enlist or commission qualified applicants in sufficient 
quantity and quality to fulfill the requirements of the Marine Corps Total Force 
Manpower Plan.3 
The mission of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command is to develop 
Marine Corps war-fighting concepts and to determine associated required capabilities in 
the areas of doctrine, organization, training and education, equipment, and support 
facilities to enable the Marine Corps to field combat-ready forces; and to participate in 
and support other major processes of the Combat Development System.4 
The Total Force Structure Division (TFSD) of Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command is tasked with determining the appropriate personnel structure 
for the Marine Corps.  An important note is that TFSD is concerned with billets, not the 
staffing of those billets.5 
The Manpower and Reserve Affairs Department assists the Commandant by 
planning, directing, coordinating, and supervising both active and reserve forces.6  The 
Manpower Plans and Policy Division of M&RA is responsible for formulating Marine 
Corps force manpower plans, including mobilization plans; determining total manpower 
                                                 
2 Major J. Grant, Officer Inventory Planner, HQMC.  Interview by authors 23 Oct 2001, Quantico, 
VA. 
3 Captain R. Williams, Waivers Officer, Marine Corps Recruiting Command, HQMC.  Interview by 
Captain M. Williams 23 Oct 2001, Quantico, VA. 
4 Mission of MCCDC.  www.mccdc.usmc.mil. 
5 Major M. Strobl, TFSD, MCCDC.   Interview by authors, 24 Oct 2001, Quantico, VA. 
6 Mission of M&RA.  osprey.manpower.usmc.mil/manpower/mi/MRA_OFCT.nsf 
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needs; preparing plans, policies, programs, and instructions on manpower matters to 
implement the Commandant's policies and decisions; determining the allocation, 
distribution and use of all Marine Corps manpower, military and civilian; preparing 
manpower budget estimates and justification; maintaining liaison with external agencies 
in manpower matters; and administering and coordinating the overall Marine Corps 
productivity improvement and total quality leadership efforts.7    
Together these agencies are responsible for ensuring that the Marine Corps has 
the proper number of trained personnel to accomplish its mission.  How the Marine Corps 
determines the proper number of trained personnel is a process called Requirements 
Identification and is an important aspect in understanding the manpower process. 
2. The Identification of Requirements 
For the Marine Corps to perform its mission, it needs Marines and equipment.  
The requirement for Marines is developed and expressed in a database called the Table of 
Manpower Requirements (TMR).  The Total Force Structure Division of MCCDC 
maintains the Table of Manpower Requirements.  The TMR prescribes the organizational 
structure, billet authorizations, and personnel strength for each Marine Corps unit.  The 
TMR also lists the Table of Organization Checklist (T/O) per unit.  The Table of 
Organization provides the billet descriptions, and grade and MOS requirements for each 
member of the unit. The development of the TMR is based upon actual fleet requirements 
and is not constrained by fiscal realities.  In fiscal year (FY) 2000, there were 154,181 
T/O structure spaces in the Marine Corps.8 
The fiscal constraints are added to the process during the Program Objective 
Memorandum (POM) stage of the manpower process.  The POM process is the resource 
allocation phase.  Congress sets end strength floors and ceilings, and the DOPMA 
dictates the officer grade distribution, but the officer end-strength is also constrained by 
what the Marine Corps can afford to buy.  In fiscal year 2001, 61 percent of the Marine 
                                                 
7 Mission of Manpower Plans and Policy Division.  www.osprey.manpower.usmc.mil/manpower/ 
mi/MRA_OFCT.nsf/MP/ Manpower+Plans+and+Policy+Division+-+Home 
8 Major M. Strobl, TFSD, MCCDC. Interview by authors, 24 Oct 2001, Quantico, VA. 
 5
Corps budget was programmed for manpower requirements.  This meant that the Marine 
Corps budgeted strength was 172,600.9   
On the surface it would seem that the budgeted strength of 172,600 was more than 
enough to cover the 154,181 T/O structure billets.  The reason, however, that all billets in 
the Marine Corps are not filled is because of another manpower constraint called “P2T2,”  
(Patients, Prisoners, Trainees, and Transients), which is a Department of Defense (DoD) 
mandated measurement tool that counts against end strength.  Patients are Marines who 
are hospitalized over thirty days.  Prisoners are Marines who are incarcerated more than 
thirty days but less than six months.  Trainees include all Marines in entry-level schools 
or follow-on schools that are in excess of 20 weeks.  Transients are Marines who are 
executing a permanent change of station.  In fiscal year 2000, there were an estimated 
27,850 Marines in P2T2 status.  If you subtract this number from the budgeted strength, 
the Marine Corps available manning is 144,750 to fill a T/O structure of 154,181.10   
MCCDC is responsible for determining how the units will be manned given the 
available manning levels.  MCCDC accomplishes this task by publishing the Troop List 
and the Authorized Strength Report (ASR).  The Troop List is a macro view of the officer 
and enlisted structure.  It reflects the aggregate number of Marines a particular unit will 
receive each year of the POM planning horizon (eight years).  The ASR is a micro view 
of the officer and enlisted structure.  The ASR breaks the manning level down by grade 
and MOS.11    
The determination of how the manning is apportioned across the various units is 
determined by type of unit.  “Excepted” units are manned and staffed at 100 percent of 
their T/O; examples are HMX-1 and the Marine Corps Recruiting Command.  “Priority” 
units are manned and staffed at 95 percent of T/O, and these units include Officer 
Candidate School and the flying squadrons.  “Pro-Share” units get what’s left.12  Figure 1 
illustrates how the percentage of manning is applied across the table of organization. 
 



























Figure 1.   Percentage of Manning Per Organizational Element. 
Source:  Major J. Grant, Officer Inventory Planner, HQMC.   
Note:  SE is supporting establishment.  GCE is ground combat element.  ACE is air combat element.  
CSSE is combat service support element.  CE is command element. 
   
When commanders are faced with the reality that they will not receive all of their 
T/O structure, and that the Troop List may have only allocated them twenty-eight of 
thirty required infantry officers, most want the senior billets manned before their junior 
billets.  The TFSD, therefore, runs a complex algorithm when producing the ASR that 
essentially attempts to “buy” the most senior billets first and then optimizes the other 
billets.  The algorithm will also completely man those billets that have only one T/O 
allocation in a unit.13   
3. The Planning Process 
Manpower Plans (MP) Division of M&RA has the responsibility of building the 
future inventory by grade and MOS.  If, for example, MCCDC has determined that there 
is a requirement for twenty-four logistics captains, then new officers must be recruited 
and trained to staff those billets.  Since it takes approximately four years time-in-service 
for an officer to get promoted to captain, MP must ensure that they send enough Marines 
from The Basic School (TBS) to the Logistics Officer MOS School in FY 2001 to fill the 
available billets in FY 2005.  If that MOS is critically short, and attrition levels are high, 
manpower planners may decide to send thirty-four officers to logistics school.  This is 
done considering, of course, the constraint that the Logistics Officer School may not have 
the staff capacity to handle a large influx of students in a particular year.14  
                                                 
13 Major M. Strobl, TFSD, MCCDC. Interview by authors, 24 Oct 2001, Quantico, VA. 
14 Major J. Grant, Officer Inventory Planner, HQMC.  Interview by authors 23 Oct 2001, Quantico, 
VA. 
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The number of future billets or ideal inventory is identified in the Grade Adjusted 
Recapitulation (GAR).  The Manpower Management Information System Support 
Division (MI) of M&RA formulates the GAR.  The GAR provides the authorized 
composition of the inventory by grade and MOS and is used as a target for recruitment, 
training, and promotion of officer and enlisted Marines.  The GAR must take into account 
the historical attrition rates, promotion rates, and retention rates of the MOS it is 
attempting to grow, and authorize a large enough cohort to meet future inventory 
demands.  The inputs to the GAR are the ASR, the B-Billet plan, (described below), and 
the number of Marines who are in P2T2 status; but the GAR is also numerically adjusted 
to consider statutory and end-strength constraints.15   
The B-Billet plan is completed by the Manpower Plans Division of M&RA.  The 
B-billet plan is the number of non-MOS billets that are attributed to each of the 
individual MOSs.  For instance, 0402 (logistics) Lieutenant Colonels are currently 
assigned sixty-three B-billets.  Of those assignments, thirty-eight were assigned to "free" 
B-billets.  "Free” B-billets are billets that any officer can actually fill. The other twenty-
five billets have 0402 as a necessary secondary MOS.  An example, is the 0502 (Marine 
Air Ground Task Force Plans) billet that requires a 0402 who is trained as a 0502.  There 
are also some Special Education Program (SEP) and acquisition billets requiring a 0402 
with a SEP or acquisition background.  The B-billet plan is currently under review 
because it does not distribute billets according to a fixed percentage of the structure.16  
Consider the summary output for the 0402 MOS as shown in Table 1. 
 LtCol Major Captain Lt 
On-Board 150 256 523 269 
ASR 82 185 288 251 
B-Billets 63 83 61 43 
T2P2 9 29 62 13 
GAR 154 297 411 307 
Percent GAR 97 86 127 88 
 
Table 1.   GAR Summary for 0402 Logistics MOS. 
Source:  Marine Corps Officer MOS Status Report, 10 Sep 2001, and Officer B-Billet Report, 1 Nov 2001 
 
                                                 
15 Mr. Brown, Deputy Director, Manpower Management Information System Support Division.  
Interview by authors 25 Oct 2001. Quantico, VA.  
16 Major J. Grant, Officer Inventory Planner, HQMC.  Interview by authors 23 Oct 2001, Quantico, 
VA. 
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The reason that the B-billet plan is important is because the GAR plays a key role 
in determining which MOSs are critically short and should be specifically noted for 
consideration in the precept that is given to the promotion boards.  An MOS is defined as 
critically short if the onboard strength is less than 85 percent of the GAR.  Now consider 
what Table 1 would have looked like if the B-billet plan assigned B-billets at a fixed 
proportion, such as 25 percent, of the ASR. 
 LtCol Major Captain Lt 
On-Board 150 256 523 269 
ASR 82 185 288 251 
B-Billets 21 46 72 63 
T2P2 9 29 62 13 
GAR 112 260 422 327 
Percent GAR 133 98 123 82 
 
Table 2.   Adjusted GAR Summary for 0402 Logistics MOS. 
 
Table 2 illuminates a problem that officer planners are currently trying to rectify.  
Because of a seemingly arbitrary assignment of B-billets, some MOSs at various grades 
such as Major are viewed as short and almost critically short, when they would not 
otherwise be considered as such if they were assigned a fixed proportion of b-billets.  It is 
evident that the converse also holds, some MOSs at various grades such as lieutenant are 
not given the consideration as being short when perhaps they should be.17 
The reason that this discrepancy occurs is the subject of the B-billet review.  The 
concern is that if the B-billet requirement is a Marine with an MOS of 0402, then the 
billet should be added to the T/O requirement.  Manpower planners can no longer afford 
to classify billets as non-MOS jobs if the requirement is that a Marine with a particular 
MOS must fill the billet. Manpower planners are therefore working to properly define the 
required MOSs that will ensure they are building to the true requirement.18 
4. The Staffing Process 
The Total Force Structure Division of MCCDC determines which billets the 
Marine Corps can afford to man, but the Personnel Management Division (MM) of 
M&RA staffs those billets.  Much of the concern with the manpower process rests with 




its inability to staff all the billets that MCCDC has determined should be manned.  For 
example, MCCDC might authorize a captain for the logistics officer in an infantry 
battalion.  There are twenty-four infantry battalions in the Marine Corps, so that equates 
to a requirement of twenty-four captains who are logistics officers.  The dilemma for 
manpower staffers, is what happens when there are not twenty-four captains in the 
assignable inventory?  Manpower and Reserve Affairs may have to assign a captain from 
a different MOS to the job; gap the billet, in which case the battalion commander would 
be forced to distribute the duties to captains filling other billets; or M&RA may have to 
assign a lieutenant to fill the captain’s billet. 
The latter solution is a central issue for this thesis.  In those MOSs that are 
identified as being critically short, manpower staffers are continually facing the dilemma 
of placing a junior Marine in a senior billet.   The concern with this staffing solution is 
that when MCCDC determines a requirement for a Marine by grade and MOS, it is not 
arbitrary.  It is actually a reflection of the fleet commander’s view that the required 
Marine has a certain skill set, level of experience and maturity, and has attained a certain 
position of authority relative to the individuals he or she will be working with.  When 
manpower staffers are forced to “satisfice” on these requirements, they are decreasing the 
commander’s ability to perform the mission.  Now it is possible that a junior Marine may, 
in fact, have the skill set and level of maturity to fill the billet requirement but even if that 
is the case, there is still the question of authority relative to other Marines. 
E. REENGINEERING THE PROMOTION SYSTEM AS A POSSIBLE 
SOLUTION 
The effect of this particular staffing dilemma has caused manpower planners to 
examine the dynamics of the Marine Corps promotion process.  Now admittedly, when 
viewed as an independent process one must conclude that the Marine Corps promotion 
system is more than successful in achieving its stated objectives.  The number of officers 
selected for promotion matches the number of projected vacancies and the selection rates 
demonstrate a fair distribution of opportunities across demographic boundaries.  Consider 
for example the overall selection statistics for promotion to major (O-4) in fiscal year 






Above Zone 111 23 20.7 
In Zone 519 441 85.0 
Below Zone 655 3   0.5 
Total 1285 467 36.3 
    
Table 3.   Selection Statistics for Fiscal Year 2001 Major Selection Board. 
Source: HQMC Maradmin 060-00 
 
 Eligible Selected 
Percent 
Selected 
  Asian American 4 4 100.0 
  African American 19 18 94.7 
  Hispanic 23 17 73.9 
  American Indian 7  5 71.4 
  Other  3 1 33.3 
  Caucasian 448 382 85.3 
  Total 504 427 84.7 
 
Table 4.   Gender/Race/Ethnic Male “In Zone” Statistics for Fiscal Year 2001 Major 
Selection Board. 
Source: HQMC Maradmin 060-00 
 
 Eligible Selected 
Percent 
Selected 
  Asian American 0 0 0.0 
  African American 2 2 100.0 
  Hispanic 1 1 100.0 
  American Indian 0  0 0.0 
  Other  0 0 0.0 
  Caucasian 12 11 91.7 
  Total 12 14 93.3 
               
Table 5.   Gender/Race/Ethnic Female “In Zone” Statistics for Fiscal Year 2001 
Major Selection Board. 
Source: HQMC Maradmin 060-00 
 
The main concern with the Marine Corps promotion process is not with the 
system itself.  The concern is how well the promotion process works when considered 
within the context of the entire manpower system.  The Marine Corps manpower system 
has the responsibility of ensuring that the right Marine gets to the right job, with the right 
training, at the right time.  Since the Marine Corps promotes individuals on an aggregate 
basis, the individuals who are promoted are the best Marines, but they do not necessarily 
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have the right skills to fill the right vacancies at the right time.  The current promotion 
system is thereby limited in its ability to affect a manpower system that can’t completely 
staff the officer billets required on the tables of organization (T/Os) by MOS or grade.19   
Amidst growing concern over officer MOS imbalances, manpower analysts began 
to consider the implications of using the Marine Corps promotion process as a possible 
force structuring tool.  As the next section will illustrate, force structuring is not a new 
issue with the Marine Corps and the authors began to consider using the promotion 
process as a force structuring tool by first attempting to understand previous force 
structuring programs. 
F. FORCE-STRUCTURING IN THE MARINE CORPS 
The Marine Corps has been struggling with the manpower dilemma for at least 20 
years.  A 1991 Headquarters Marine Corps decision paper noted that “since the 1977 
decision to open ten previously restricted officer Military Occupational Specialties 
(MOSs) to unrestricted officers, several MOSs have perennially experienced critical 
shortages of qualified officers.  These shortages occurred for several reasons but 
primarily due to unsupportable grade structures.”20   
Figures 2 and 3 give two examples of unsupportable grade structures that the 
Marine Corps faces today.  Figure 2, illustrates the grade structure requirement for MOS 
4302, Public Affairs Officer.  The reader will note that at the base there is a small 
requirement for officers in the grade of lieutenant.  This requirement nearly doubles at the 
grade of captain.  The problem, of course, is that since there is no lateral entry into the 
Marine Corps, it is difficult to fill the requirements for the grade of captain when there is 
not a sufficient requirement for lieutenants who can progress into these billets. 
 
                                                 
19 Wielsma Ronald J., Our Manpower Dilemma. Marine Corps Gazette. Quantico VA. Mar 2001. p. 
40. 
20 HQMC Decision Paper 1040 MPP-32.  Lateral Move Incentive Program. 23 September 1991. 
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Figure 2.   Grade Structure for MOS 4302 Public Affairs Officer. 
Source: ASR numbers taken from MOS status report dated 10 Sep 2001. 
Provided by Major A. Madril, Officer Promotion Planner, HQMC.21 
 
Figure 3 represents the grade structure for MOS 0302 Infantry Officer and depicts 
the unbalanced grade structure that is created because the number of Infantry Officers 
that are promoted and retained exceeds the requirement for these officers.  A 1994 
General Officer Symposium Issue Paper noted that “MOS structures and the high 
retention rates of ground combat officers have had a detrimental effect on the overall skill 
balance of the officer force.  Currently, 90 percent of ground MOSs are out of balance.”22 
 
    Percentage Required from                           Percentage Promoted 























Figure 3.   Grade Structure for MOS 0302 Infantry Officer 
Source: Requirement numbers taken from MOS status report dated 10 Sep 2001.  Provided by Major A. 
Madril, Officer Promotion Planner, HQMC. Promotion numbers provided by Major G. Branigan, Officer 
Promotion Planner, HQMC. 
1 AFQ is All Fully Qualified.  This is the current selection standard for promotion to captain in the Marine 
Corps and the promotion rate is currently 99.5%. 
 
                                                 
21 The grade structure depicted in this illustration does not include the grades of colonel and general 
because a Marine promoted to the grade of colonel is assigned a new MOS which reflects the more 
generalized nature of their duties. 
22 General Officer Symposium. Issue Paper on the Officer Career Transition Program.  24 August 
1994. Prepared by Major Mark Noblit. 
 13
Prior to 1983, Headquarters Marine Corps addressed the issue of MOS 
management23 by authorizing Lateral Movement and Career Broadening Tours.  Lateral 
Movement was a reclassification of officers between MOSs. A Career Broadening Tour 
was a voluntary tour of duty outside of an officer's primary MOS to a short MOS of an 
officer’s choice. Officers approved for the lateral move received a new primary MOS; 
however, a career broadening tour only resulted in an additional MOS.24 In order to apply 
for a lateral move, an officer had to be in an over or balanced MOS and had to request 
reclassification into an MOS that was listed as being short for his or her grade.25     
The problem with the Lateral Movement and Career Broadening programs was 
that many experienced combat arms officers resisted moving into the technical fields.  
The fear of being stereotyped, of missing the “good” assignments, and of being left 
behind by their peers caused many officers to avoid career broadening tours or lateral 
moves to fields that were not traditional.26 
In May 1983, confronted with the reality that the Voluntary Lateral Move 
program had not provided a sufficient number of officers willing to move into the short 
fields, Headquarters Marine Corps implemented the Directed Lateral Move program.  
The Directed Lateral Move program was applicable to reserve officers on active duty and 
coincided with a decision point called augmentation in which reserve officers applied for 
a presidential commission in the Marine Corps. 27,28    
                                                 
23 The term “MOS Management” specifically refers to the structuring of personnel assets within an 
MOS in order to maintain the MOS at its optimal strength of officers and ensure a flow of officers in the 
MOS from the grade of second lieutenant through the grade of lieutenant colonel.  Marine Corps Order 
(MCO) 1210.8A. MPP-34-gms dated 21 Sep 1982.  Lateral Move and Career Broadening Tour Programs 
for Marine Officers.   
24 MCO 1210.8A. MPP-34-gms dated 21 Sep 1982. 
25 An “Over MOS” refers to an MOS in which the actual number of officers exceeds the optimal 
strength that has been established for that particular MOS.  In this same context a  “Balanced MOS” refers 
to an MOS in which the actual number of officers is equal to the optimal strength for that particular MOS.  
A “Short MOS” refers to an MOS in which the actual number of officers is less than the optimal strength 
that has been established for that particular MOS.  MCO 1210.8A. MPP-34-gms dated 21 Sep 1982. 
26 Jacobs, Major Roger A. Coping With Creeping Careerism.  Marine Corps Gazette. January 1983. pg 
42.  
27 HQMC Decision Paper 1210 MMOA-3.  MOS Assignments for Lieutenants at the Basic School.  30 
November 1988. 
28 The term “reserve officers” in this context refers to those officers on active duty in the Marine Corps 
who had not attained a regular commission in the Marine Corps.  During this time period officers 
commissioned from the service academies or the Naval Reserve Officer Training Programs received a 
regular commission at appointment as Second Lieutenants.  Officers recruited after completion of college 
received a reserve commission.  Reserve officers who did not apply or were not augmented were separated 
from active duty upon completion of their obligated service. 
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The Reserve officers applying for augmentation who were in overpopulated 
MOSs were required to submit two choices for a lateral move from a list of 
underpopulated MOSs as part of their augmentation application.  However, the actual 
augmentation selection process was based on the best-qualified criteria only.  Upon 
completion of the augmentation selection process, the officer retention board would 
review the records of all selectees who were in over MOSs for possible directed lateral 
moves.29 
The problem with the Directed Lateral Move program was that the pool of reserve 
officers was inversely related to the retention of regular officers.  United States Code 10, 
Stat 522, limits the size of the regular Marine officer structure to 17,000 officers.30  In 
1984, high retention of regular officers resulted in only 367 of the 1,149 applicants being 
granted augmentation.  In 1985 only 114 of the 1,100 applicants received augmentation.31 
In September 1986, the Commandant of the Marine Corps supplemented the 
Directed Lateral Move program with the Intended MOS program.  The program was 
applicable to regular and reserve officers and was designed to forestall shortages resulting 
from excessive attrition in certain MOSs while still allowing maximum exposure of the 
lieutenants to the combat arms.  Officers would not begin their intended MOS until they 
completed their initial tour and/or were augmented.   The intended MOS program 
commenced with the officers of Basic Class 5-87 (June 1987).32  The first officers were 
scheduled to receive their intended MOS skill qualifying training commencing in the fall 
of 1989 but the program was cancelled and replaced by the Additional Primary MOS 
(APMOS) program prior to any officers training in their intended MOSs.33 
The Additional Primary MOS program was designed for Captains and above.  
Upon selection for promotion to Captain, Marines would be assigned an additional 
primary MOS in a field that was traditionally short of officers or in which the                                                  
29 Scharfen, Col J.C. USMC (Ret). Views on Manpower: An Interview with LtGen W.R. Maloney, 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower. Marine Corps Gazette. February 1985. p. 57. 
30 Beckwith, Brigadier General Ronald L. Insights on Augmentation. Marine Corps Gazette. December 
1986. p. 27. 
31 Edwards, Major Michael E. Competing for a Regular Commission. Marine Corps Gazette, February 
1985. p. 14. 
32 HQMC Decision Paper 1210 MMOA-3.  MOS Assignments For Lieutenants at the Basic School.  
30 November 1988. 
33 Interview by authors with Major J. Grant, Officer Inventory Planner, HQMC. 
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requirements at the captain and major grades equaled or exceeded the lieutenant 
requirements. 
The initial guidance on the Additional Primary MOS program was that all 
unrestricted officers would receive an APMOS.  Some critically short MOSs such as 
Adjutant and Intelligence were later omitted.  MOSs that were to be assigned as 
APMOSs were not necessarily short, but ones that could become short in the future.  The 
purpose of the APMOS program was to provide a pool of officers from various MOSs to 
be available, if the need ever arose to use them.34 
The Additional Primary MOS program was not successful because of the timing 
of the additional primary MOS assignment.  Most officers who would have filled an 
APMOS assignment were already serving in B-billets.35  APMOS selection did not 
coincide with B-billet planning and assignment execution.  Additionally, officers 
assigned to an APMOS tour would have been unable to return to their PMOS in time for 
career level schools and/or command time.36 
In September of 1991 Headquarters Marine Corps approved a lateral move 
incentive program to be utilized in conjunction with the officer retention board.  The 
program set aside a number of augmentation vacancies, up to fifty percent per year, for 
officers in certain overpopulated MOSs who volunteered to change their PMOS to a 
critically short MOS and for officers who possessed a critically short MOS.  These 
officers had a greater opportunity to be selected for augmentation.  Officers who were 
considered but not selected in the short MOSs would also be considered for the remaining 
vacancies with the remaining officers and retain their primary MOS.37 
In 1994 an issue paper for the General Officer Symposium stated that after more 
than a decade of experimenting with different programs designed to achieve the correct 
number of officers in each grade and MOS, no significant progress had been made 
toward achieving the objective.  MOS structures and the high retention rates of ground 
                                                 
34 General Officer Symposium. Issue Paper on the Officer Career Transition Program.  24 August 
1994. Prepared by Major Mark Noblit. 
35 “B-billets are non-MOS tours of duty in such areas as recruiting or the drill-field. 
36Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps Committee Brief.  Career Transition: Forced Lateral 
Moves. 13 April 1998. 
37 Ibid. 
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combat arms officers had a detrimental effect on the overall skill balance of the officer 
force and, at the time, 90 percent of non-aviation MOSs were out of balance.  While 
some combat arms MOSs had more that 150 percent of their required field grade officers, 
some combat support MOSs had less than 50 percent.38 
In 1995 the Career Transition, also referred to as “Forced Lateral Move,” program 
was implemented and replaced the Additional Primary MOS program.  Under the 
program, reserve officers in over MOSs had to list three other MOS choices when 
submitting their augmentation packages.  The Officer Retention Board then selected 
officers for augmentation into the regular Marine Corps and decided which officers 
would be allowed to remain in their primary MOS and which officers would be career 
transitioned into another MOS.  Officers selected for career transition would be sent to 
school for training in their new MOS and then reassigned to a billet in that MOS.39 
The Career Transition program provided short MOSs with school-trained, quality 
officers and infused combat arms experience into the support MOSs, but it was an 
immensely unpopular program that was perceived as unfair and caused many officers not 
to apply for augmentation.  The fear of being forcibly moved into another MOS often 
out-weighed an officer’s desire to remain on active duty.  Some officers even turned 
down augmentation when forced to lateral move and then reapplied the following year.  
The idea was to extend their active duty contract until they were past their fifth year of 
commissioned service and then they would no longer be eligible for the career 
transition.40 
In All Marine Message (ALMAR) 210-98, while noting that a sense of fairness 
was key to the manpower process, the Commandant of the Marine Corps directed an end 
to forced lateral moves.  One month later ALMAR 236-98 announced the initiation of the 
Supplementary MOS (SMOS) program. 
Under the Supplementary MOS program, company grade officers in an over MOS 
volunteer to do a three-year tour in a short MOS and upon completion of the tour return 
                                                 
38 General Officer Symposium. Issue Paper on the Officer Career Transition Program.  24 August 
1994. Prepared by Major Mark Noblit. 
39 Career Transition Task Force working group report.  4 February 1998. 
40 Ibid. 
 17
to their primary MOS.  The SMOS tour takes the place of the B-billet tour and an officer 
would therefore return to his primary career field for career-level school consideration 
and follow-on primary MOS assignments at the same time as those officers not 
participating in the program.41 
The benefits of the SMOS program are that it has the potential to balance MOSs 
in a relatively short time period, and the negative morale issues associated with leaving 
one’s desired MOS are minimized.  The drawback to the program is that very few 
qualified applicants volunteer each year.  The program averages fifteen to twenty 
qualified officers per year and on many occasions applicants are individuals who are 
from a short or unpopular MOS who are trying to escape from their MOS.  The number 
of applicants is also limited by school seat constraints, especially if another service owns 
the school.  Currently there is little incentive to volunteer for this program.42 
G. CONCLUSION 
The Marine Corps promotion process is currently not structured to ensure that 
officers of the desired grades are available to fill the billet vacancies throughout the 
organization.  One could argue that while the system is designed to keep the best 
Marines, the system is hindering MOS proficiency and experience.   
This manpower dilemma and the historical problems that have been encountered 
in attempting to structure the force have caused manpower analysts at Headquarters 
Marine Corps to consider innovative and far-reaching force structuring solutions such as 
reengineering the Marine Corps promotion process. The authors explore these issues 
beginning with the next chapter, which provides a historical overview and detailed 








                                                 
41 MCO 1210.9 MPP-30 dated 12 Feb 01.  Supplementary MOS (SMOS) Program and Voluntary 
Lateral Move Program for Marine Corps Officers.  
42 Grant, Major Joseph.  Position Paper MPP-30. Force Shaping Policy Options with Associated Cost 
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II. THE OPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE 
CORPS UNRESTRICTED OFFICER PROMOTION PROCESS 
A. PROMOTION PROCESS   
The focus of this chapter is the operation of the United States Marine Corps 
unrestricted officer promotion process.  The chapter begins with a historical review of the 
policies and practices that lead to the current promotion system.  This review provides the 
framework for understanding why the promotion process must continually evolve to meet 
the demands of the Marine Corps.    
The chapter continues with a documentation of the Marine Corps promotion 
process.  The promotion process is an interdependent part of the Marine Corps manpower 
process and must be viewed in the context of a larger system.  To detail how the 
promotion system works within the manpower system, the authors conducted several 
interviews with key officers at Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
(MCCDC), and Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA), from 22 October to 26 October 
2001.  The section of this chapter that is entitled “The Marine Corps Manpower Process,” 
relates information that was provided by the officers at MCCDC and M&RA.  
B. HISTORY AND STATUTORY BASIS 
Prior to 1892, promotion by seniority was the generally accepted military 
practice, as seniority was equated with experience.  Problems with a promotion system 
based solely on seniority, however, had been illuminated for years at every level of the 
Corps.43  On 3 March 1818, Major Anthony Gale was appointed the fourth Commandant 
of the Marine Corps.  Major Gale was the senior officer, but he was not a man of 
outstanding ability and he had been, on several occasions, reported for misconduct.  The 
Secretary of the Navy, Smith Thompson, made the appointment despite his grave 
misgivings over Gale’s notorious record of intemperate conduct.  With less than two 
years as Commandant, Major Gale was court-martialed for disgraceful conduct in the 
City of Washington.44  The seniority based promotion system also resulted in stagnation 
                                                 
43 Clyde H. Metcalf. A History of the United States Marine Corps. New York: A. P. Putnam’s Sons, 
1939, p. 82. 
44 Ibid. 
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in the officer ranks because there was no system to encourage or require the departure of 
senior officers and vacancies in the senior grades were infrequent. 
The structure of the Marine Corps promotion system changed significantly on 28 
July 1892, when promotion to every grade of commissioned officer below the grade of 
Commandant was made subject to the judgment of an examining board of senior 
officers.45  Under this system, it was expected that officers who were best qualified would 
be selected for advancement, while those least qualified would be passed over and have 
to ultimately retire. 
At the time, the Marine Corps had never exceeded a total end strength of three 
thousand and initially it was expected that the new system would force many officers out 
of the Marine Corps.  Instead, America’s war with Spain and the consequent expansion of 
functions of Marines throughout the world resulted in the size of the organization more 
than tripling in strength.  This rapid expansion of the size of the Corps from 1898 to 1916 
virtually assured a liberal flow of promotions to all ranks.46 
The Marine Corps also broadened in its intellectual scope during the early years 
of the twentieth century.  Many of the Corps’ officers had been men of limited schooling 
but the new order required that officers have a liberal education prior to being 
commissioned.  By requiring a formal education for its officers, as well as a system of 
professional training, the military profession was brought more in line with the learned 
professions.47 
Now, although more attention was directed to improving the quality of entering 
officers and on the professional development of officers, there was still no mechanism to 
ensure a structured promotion flow or to ensure the high quality of performance through 
competition for promotion. 
 
 
                                                 
45 Nalty B. C., Strobridge T. R., Turnbladh E. T., Gill R. P., Marine Corps Historical Reference 
Pamphlet.  United States Marine Corps Ranks and Grades 1775 – 1969. Historical Division Headquarters, 
U. S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C., 1970, p. 6. 
46 Metcalf, p. 305. 
47 Ibid. 
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1. The Act of 29 May 1934 
Representative Clark W. Thompson of Texas, a Marine veteran of World War I, 
articulated the problems with the Marine Corps promotion system in 1934 while lobbying 
in support of House Resolution 6803, a bill to regulate the distribution, promotion, 
retirement, and discharge of commissioned officers in the Marine Corps.  He stated: 
Each officer, as a vacancy occurs, is promoted after prescribed 
examinations--moral, professional, and physical--but there is no method of 
promoting only the able, zealous, and efficient officer.  The less able can 
and do qualify for promotion under the obsolete and inefficient 
requirements of the present laws and must be promoted.  Only a few are 
retired because of physical disability or are eliminated because of moral 
failure.  Only one officer has failed professionally in the last eight years.  
Colonels are promoted by selection, and only in this grade is there 
enforced retirement because of failure to be on a promotion or eligible list. 
Under the present laws the average rate of promotion is so slow that a 
junior officer must spend most of his service in the lower grades, and can 
reach the higher grades only a short time before retirement for age. 
Last year there were so few promotions that, in future years at the same 
rate, it would require fifty-five years to pass through the grade of captain, 
and twenty-five years to pass through the grade of major. 
This bill, if enacted into law, when its provisions become fully effective... 
will correct the present stagnation of promotion and over-age of 
commissioned officers of the Marine Corps, and will result in average 
service in each grade of about seven years, which is what it should be. 
Because of the stagnation and lack of promotion in the Marine Corps, 29 
percent of the colonels, 98 percent of the lieutenant colonels, 72 percent of 
the majors, and practically 100 percent of the captains and first lieutenants 
are now over-age for their respective grades.  In ten years without relief, 
88 percent of the colonels and 100 percent of all other junior officers now 
in the corps will be over-age in grade. 
The salient measures in Thompson’s bill ensured: 
• Promotion by selection to the grades of lieutenant colonel, colonel, 
brigadier general, and major general 
• Promotion to captain and major by seniority 
• Extension of the selection system to the lower grades should such 
extension be authorized for the Navy 
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• Promotion of second lieutenants after three years commissioned service 
• Readjustment of grades to conform to the needs of the Marine Corps 
• Retirement of non-selected colonels after thirty-five years of active service 
instead of at fifty-six years of age48 
The bill passed both houses of Congress and was signed into law by President 
Roosevelt on 29 May 1934.49  The promotion system was modified somewhat by every 
Congress after 1934, until the Act of 23 June 1938 finally culminated in a common 
promotion system for both the Marine Corps and Navy.50  
2. The Act of 23 June 1938 
The Act of June 23, 1938, applied the system of promotion by selection to all 
officers in the naval service.  Clearly the old order of promotion by seniority had ended.  
Stipulations of the Act of 1938 mandated that: 
• The authorized total number and distribution in grades for line officers 
were to be determined by the Secretary of the Navy based on a set formula 
for distribution and the level of authorized enlisted strength 
• No officer was to be a member of two successive selection boards 
• All promotions above first lieutenant were to be upon recommendation of 
a selection board composed of nine senior officers of specified grades.  
The oath to be administered to the selection board was also specified and 
proceedings of the board were to be secret. 
• A minimum of four years service in grade was required for captains and 
above before they could become eligible for consideration by a selection 
board 
• The Secretary of the Navy must provide selection boards with information 
concerning the number of estimated vacancies to be filled, the names of 
officers eligible for consideration and placed in the promotion zone, the 
records of the eligible officers in the zone, and the content required in the 
report of the board 
• Eligible officers could invite the attention of a board considering them for 
promotion to any matter in the eligible officers’ records 
• Selection of officers would be on a “best fitted” basis except that the 
Secretary of the Navy could authorize a prescribed percentage to be 
                                                 
48 Legislation: Personnel Situation,” Marine Corps Gazette, May, 1934, pg. 18. (qtd, in Simanikas, W. 
C. The U.S. Marine Corps Officer Promotion System:  An Assessment of Factors Affecting Promotion to 
the Field Grades.  Thesis. George Washington University, 1966. pp. 24-27.) 
49 Ibid. p. 27. 
50 Ibid. p. 28. 
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selected as “fitted” for promotion  [“Fitted” selections were later 
eliminated from law.] 
• The duties of selection boards were to include the selection for promotion, 
in the prescribed numbers authorized by the Secretary of the Navy, of 
those officers best fitted for promotion among those on the list furnished 
by the Secretary.  The board was also required to designate remaining 
officers as fitted for promotion within the prescribed limits or, when 
applicable, to report those officers unsatisfactory in performance of duty 
in present grade.  At least six of the nine members were required to concur 
in the selection of the best fitted officers. 
• Officers failed of selection (passed-over) as best fitted twice in succession 
were to be retired or discharged dependent on grade attained and years of 
active commissioned service completed 
• The selection board was to further recommend, from among the majors, 
lieutenant colonels, and colonels twice passed over, those officers to be 
retained on active duty in grade until completion of twenty-six, twenty-
eight, and thirty years of commissioned service.  The number to be 
retained were to be authorized by the Secretary of the Navy to meet the 
immediate requirements of the Marine Corps.51 
3. The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 
The Officer Personnel Act of 1947, with subsequent amendments, mandated 
another significant change to the Marine Corps promotion system. In the terms of its 
preamble, the act was intended to serve three purposes: 
• Provide in law an adequate number of officers in the proper grades and of 
the proper ages to meet the needs of the service 
• Authorize grade distribution that would provide a sufficiently attractive 
career so that high caliber people would be attracted to service 
• Eliminate the weak officer as early in a career as possible52 
The Act was important because it added the concept of “officer distribution” to 
the promotion process.  It imposed statutory ceilings on the number of regular officers on 
active duty and established a percentage system for distribution of these officers among 
the various grades on a permanent basis.  Officers would move through various grades in 
cohorts (normally year groups) and be considered for promotion at various points in their 
                                                 
51 “The Selection Law,” Marine Corps Gazette, March, 1939 p. 34 (qtd. in Simanikas, pp. 30-31). 
52 Rostker B., Thie H., Lacy J., Kawata J., Purnell S., The Defense Officer Procurement Management 
Act:  A Retrospective Assessment. RAND 1993. p. 91. 
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careers consistent with norms set in the Act.  As in previous legislation, if an officer 
failed selection for promotion twice, he would either be separated or retired.53 
The Act provided a much more effective management system than the Officer 
Corps had ever known in the past, but it still had a number of shortcomings.  It was based 
upon the assumption that the armed forces would be returned to a small, all-regular force 
within ten years and it therefore imposed statutory limitations on the number of regular 
officers in each service.  To provide for the transition, it allowed the Secretary of Defense 
the authority for temporary promotions whenever the number of officers in any regular 
grade above second lieutenant was less than the number authorized, or whenever, under 
authority of Congress, the number of regular and reserve officers on active duty was 
more than the authorized strength of the services.54 
The Act embraced different approaches to the grade distribution of officers.  With 
respect to permanent grades, the law provided grade-distribution ceilings for the Navy 
and Marine Corps that were identical to each other, but different from the ceilings 
authorized for the Army and Air Force.  For example, the Act authorized the Army and 
Air Force to have 8 percent of officers in the grade of colonel whereas the authorization 
for the Navy and Marine Corps was 6 percent.55  
Further emphasizing the accent on youth, the Act provided for attainment of the 
rank of Brigadier General at least by the completion of thirty years commissioned service 
for those surviving the selection process to that point.  It also incorporated an 
“accelerated promotion plan,” which allowed a selection board to promote up to 5 percent 
of the total number of authorized selections, if officers below the promotion zone were 
otherwise eligible (by virtue of minimum required time in grade) and outstandingly 
qualified.56 
 
                                                  
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 H203-24 Report to accompany S. 1918.  Defense Officer Personnel Management Act. Nov 13, 
1980. 
56 “Report on Promotion Bill,” Army and Navy Journal, June 21, 1947, p. 1085. (qtd. in Simanikas, p. 
37). 
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4. The Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954 
In 1954, Congress passed the Officer Grade Limitation Act (OGLA).  The OGLA 
regulated temporary promotions by imposing statutory limitations on the number of 
regular and reserve officers who could serve in the grades of major and above, and 
established grade tables for the military and these grade tables provided the maximum 
grade authority (total number of officers) for the entire officer corps.  The OGLA also 
established a sliding scale based on the range of officer end-strength (excluding medical, 
dental, general officers and certain others).  The following table illustrates the percentage 
of officers that could occupy a specified grade, given a certain end-strength: 
 
 212,500 313,500 
Colonel (O-6)  5.85 5.0
Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) 12.95 11.75
 
Table 6.   Percentage of Officers Allowed in Field Grades According to Designated 
Endstrength. 
Source: Rand National Defense Research Institute57 
In addition to speeding up the promotion flow, the OGLA stabilized the equality 
of promotion opportunity across years.  It required that promotion opportunity be forecast 
over at least a five-year period by comparing anticipated vacancies in a particular grade 
with the number of officers coming into promotion zones during that period.  The 
promotion opportunity given to each year’s promotion zone was to be kept essentially the 
same by varying the number of officers brought into the zone and maintaining the same 
numerical relationship with vacancies.  This would help to prevent major changes in 
opportunity from year to year.58   
5. The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act 
In 1960, the Department of Defense formed the “Bolte committee” to review the 
Officer Personnel Act and to recommend changes that would achieve uniformity in the 
officer career management systems. The recommendations of the Bolte committee were 
never enacted into law but in 1972, with growing concern that the military still had too 
                                                 
57 Rostker B., Thie H., Lacy J., Kawata J., Purnell S., p. 95. 
58 “Text of Promotion Act,” Army and Navy Journal, August 2, 1947, p. 1280. 
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many senior officers, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a written 
report “regarding limitations on the number of officers who may serve in the various 
commissioned grades…[and] include…such recommendations he deems appropriate for 
legislation to establish new permanent [grade] limitations.”59  The resulting “Report on 
Officer Grade Limitations” set forth the provisions to be included in a new Defense 
Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA).  DOPMA was ultimately approved in 
November of 1980.60 
The specific purpose of DOPMA was to revise the laws that govern the 
management of commissioned officers serving on active duty in the Army, Navy, Marine 
Corps, and Air Force below the grade of brigadier general or rear admiral.  The bill to 
enact DOPMA contained five major provisions pertaining to promotion: 
• Establish new statutory limitations on the number of officers who may 
serve in the senior grades below flag rank 
• Provide uniform laws for the appointment of regular officers and for the 
active-duty service of reserve officers 
• Provide uniform laws for promotion procedures for officers in the separate 
services 
• Establish common provisions governing career expectations in the various 
grades 
• Establish common mandatory separation and retirement points61 
Under DOPMA, Congress specifies the number of officers allowed in each field 
grade above O-3.  Known as the “Officer Grade Distribution” and published in the 
DOPMA grade table, the distribution varies as a function of total officer end-strength.  
Specifically the Marine Corps is allowed to promote 435 new field grade officers for 
every 2,500 newly commissioned officers.  The Navy is allowed 750 field grades for 
every 3,000 new officers.  The Army and Air Force are allowed 1,264 and 1,290 field 
grades, respectively, for every 5,000 new officers.  The constant increment of field-grade 
                                                 
59 Rostker B., Thie H., Lacy J., Kawata J., Purnell S., p. 6. 
60 Ibid. 
61 H203-24 Report to accompany S. 1918.  Defense Officer Personnel Management Act.  Nov 13, 
1980. 
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officers for equal incremental steps of officer end-strength results in relatively more field 
grade officers for the Marine Corps because it is a smaller force.62 
The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act did away with the temporary 
promotion system and provided that all officers become regular officers by the time they 
reach the eleventh year of service or are promoted to the grade of O-4.  DOPMA also 
provided a tenure rule that allowed approximately 50 percent of officers to be appointed 
regular officers upon commissioning.  The problem with this rule was that it made an 
officer’s commissioning source, and not his fleet performance, the determining factor in 
whether or not he would be allowed continued service.  The 1992 National Defense 
Authorization Act changed this portion of DOPMA and after September 30, 1996 all 
officers initially began commissioned service as reserve officers.63 
The DOPMA system not only provided a standard for career progression for the 
majority of officers, but it also provided for early and late promotions.  It established 
three promotion zones for consideration: The “above-zone,” the “primary-zone,” and the 
“below-zone.”  Primary-zone officers represent the primary eligible population for 
consideration by the selection board.  These officers have neither failed selection for 
promotion nor have they been removed from a promotion list.  Above-zone officers have 
been previously considered in the primary zone, and were not selected for promotion.  
These officers will incur an additional failure of selection if not selected by the selection 
board.64  Below-zone officers are junior to the junior officer in the primary zone.  Below-
zone officers are eligible for consideration, but if not selected, they will not incur a 
failure of selection.  
The DOPMA also provided specific authority for the service Secretaries to 
convene selection boards; to establish guidelines for board composition; and to provide 
for notification to eligible officers of promotion zones and convening dates.  It required 
the service Secretary to specifically furnish information relating to the skill needs of the 
armed forces, and required that all guidance given to the selection board be consistent 
                                                 
62 Rostker B., Thie H., Lacy J., Kawata J., Purnell S., pp. 8-9. 
63 Ibid. pp. 11-12. 
64 Marine Corps Promotion Manual, Volume 1, Officer Promotions.  MCO P1400.31B MMPR-1 22 
Feb 2000. p. 12. 
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with provisions that govern the selection and promotion of officers.  The Act further 
provided standard language for the oath to be taken by members of the boards and 
established board reporting and reviewing procedures.65   
Additionally, the DOPMA gave authority to the service Secretaries to establish 
competitive categories for promotion for each service, provided the categories were 
consistent with guidance from the Secretary of Defense.  The separate promotion 
categories were needed for various groups of officers whose extensive training and 
experience, and often narrow utilization, made it impossible for them to compete for 
promotion on an equal footing with other officers having more generalized experience.66 
6. Title 10, U. S. Code 
Congress, by the Act of August 10, 1956, incorporated into Title 10 of the U. S. 
Code the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, the Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954 and 
the Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954.67  As a result, the DOPMA addressed, revised 
and updated specific portions of the U.S. Code.  Accordingly, Title 10, U. S. Code is the 
authority for convening promotion selection boards and effecting promotions for 
commissioned officers.  Certain sections of Title 10 are applicable to the Marine Corps 
and are particularly relevant to this discussion: 
Section 523:  Limits the authorized end strength of Colonels, Lieutenant 
Colonels and Majors. 
Section 615:  Requires that the Secretary of the Navy furnish information 
to the selection boards concerning the need for officers having particular 
skills.68 
Section 616:  Mandates that the Secretary establish the number of officers 
the board may recommend for promotion from the “below zone.”69 
Section 619:  Allows the Secretary of the Navy to preclude from 
consideration by a selection board an officer with an established 
                                                 
65 H203-24 Report to accompany S. 1918.  Defense Officer Personnel Management Act. Nov 13, 
1980. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Simanikas, p. 46. 
68 The Marine Corps policy is to identify, in the precepts, those skill areas [military occupational 
specialties (MOSs)], which are critically short of their requirement.  The definition of critically short will 
be later defined in this paper. 
69 Such number may not exceed 10 percent of the total number of selections authorized for a 
competitive category and grade. 
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separation date that is within 90 days after the date the board convenes.  
Section 620:  Requires that the Secretary of the Navy maintain a lineal 
precedence list of all officers serving on active duty in the Marine Corps.  
This lineal precedence list is the basis for determining when an officer will 
reach the primary zone for promotion. 
Section 623:  Requires that the Secretary determine the number of officers 
in the promotion zone over a five-year period.70 
 
The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act continues to be the major piece 
of legislation that governs the operation of the military promotion processes.  In 
September 1990, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) 
asked RAND to review the operations of the DOPMA and to recommend any changes to 
that legislation.  RAND concluded that the future focus should be on how change to the 
existing system contributes to performance as the ultimate criterion and satisfies 
intermediate criteria relating to the needs of officer management and officers.  In order to 
conceptualize how the Marine Corps promotion system can best be structured to enhance 
the efficiency of the Marine Corps, this study will begin with a detailed review of the 
current Marine Corps Promotion Process. 
C. THE OPERATION OF THE CURRENT MARINE CORPS PROMOTION 
PROCESS 
1. Purpose 
The purpose of the Marine Corps unrestricted officer promotion process is to 
select officers for promotion who have the potential to carry out the duties and 
responsibilities of the next higher grade.  Promotions are based upon past performance as 
indicated in the official military personnel file but are considered to be an incentive to 
excel in the next higher grade, not a reward for past performance.71 
The Marine Corps Officer promotion process is a critical element of the 
manpower process.  The flow of promotions follows a pyramidal, hierarchical structure 
                                                 
70 Legal Information Institute.  United States Code: Title 10.  www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10. 
71 Marine Corps Promotion Manual, Volume 1, Officer Promotions.  MCO P1400.31B MMPR-1 22 
Feb 2000. 
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of grade distribution due to smaller requirements for senior officers.  This process means 
that not all of those who enter at the bottom can rise to the narrow top.72    
The Commandant of the Marine Corps has divided the Officer Corps into five 
major promotion categories: Unrestricted Officers, Restricted (Limited Duty Officers), 
Warrant/Chief Warrant Officers, Active Reservist, and Specialist Officers.  Within these 
categories, officers compete for promotion either on the active-duty list or the reserve 
active-status list in one of three promotion zones: above-zone, in-zone, and below-zone.73  
Above-zone officers have been previously considered but were not selected for 
promotion by a regularly scheduled board.  In-zone (Promotion Zone) refers to those 
primary eligible officers who have not previously failed selection for promotion.  Below-
zone officers are junior to the officers in the promotion zone, but if not selected, do not 
incur a failure of selection marking.  Not all boards are authorized to consider below-
zone officers.74 
The promotion board is governed by a legal document from the Secretary of the 
Navy called a precept.  The precept authorizes the selection board to convene and 
appoints the president, members, and recorders for the board.  Within the precept for the 
selection board the Secretary of the Navy may provide special consideration for items 
deemed important for consideration.  Such guidance, for example, may identify Military 
Occupational Specialties (MOS) that have a critical skill shortage.  An MOS is 
considered to have a critical skill shortage if it is at less than 85 percent of the ideal 
inventory for the grade being considered.75          
Normal factors that are taken into consideration in the Marine Corps promotion 
process include: 
• The aggregate number of billets needed to meet the needs of the Marine 
Corps 
• The estimated number of officers needed to fill vacancies during the 
period in which it is anticipated that the officers selected for promotion 
will be promoted                                                  






• The number of officers authorized by the Secretary of the Navy to serve in 
the grade and competitive category under consideration 
• The authorized number of officers that the Secretary of the Navy has 
determined that the selection board may recommend for promotion 
• The impact of zone size and selection opportunity on time-in-service 
promotion flow to the next higher grade76 
The major focus of the Marine Corps promotion system is the promotion of 
unrestricted active duty officers.  An unrestricted officer is an individual in the grade of 
second lieutenant or above, who is not designated as a Limited Duty Officer.  These 
officers represent the majority of billets within the Marine Corps and the selection of 
these officers is an important factor in the success of the organization.  All unrestricted 
officers compete against all other unrestricted officers of the same grade from promotion 
to captain through major general and each unrestricted officer has the same theoretical 
opportunity as his contemporaries to attain promotion to the top grades.  The selection 
standard for all eligible officers is best and fully qualified for promotion.77 
2. The Five-Year Promotion Plan 
The annual Marine Corps unrestricted officer promotion process begins when the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps submits the five-year colonel through captain 
promotion plan to the Secretary of the Navy for approval.  Per Title 10, U.S. Code, the 
Secretary of the Navy determines the number of officers in the promotion zones over a 
five-year period.  This number of promotions in the plan is intended to provide for 
equitable promotion opportunities among succeeding groups of officers and an adequate 
number to meet requirements.78 An example of the five-year promotion plan for selection 




                                                 
76 Ibid. 
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Selected Flow Point 
02 621     122    243 50 12 22 years  3 
03 621     105    210 50 10 22 years  3 
04 621     107   214 50 10 22 years  2 
05 621     106    212 50 10 22 years  1 
06 621     107    214 50 10 22 years  0 
            
Table 7.   Five-Year Officer Promotion Plan for Selection to the Rank of Colonel. 
Source:  Major A. Madril, Officer Promotion Planner, HQMC, 23 Oct 2001, Quantico, VA 
Based on the five-year plan above, the following promotion zones would be 
authorized: 
Senior In Zone 
LtCol M. Williams (LCN 0080000) 
DOR:  1 February 1996 
YCS:  22 years and 4 months 
TIG:   4 years and 8 months 
 
Junior In Zone 
LtCol B. Roberts (LCN 01274000) 
DOR:  1 December 1996 
YCS:  21 years and 9 months 
TIG:   3 years and 10 months 
 
Junior Eligible Below Zone 
LtCol A. Crawford (LCN 01642000) 
DOR:  1 October 1997 
YCS:   20 years and 5 months 
TIG:    3 years and 0 months 
 
For fiscal year 2001, the colonel through captain promotion plan reflected the 





 Number to 
Select 
Percentage Opportunity  
for Selection 
Colonel (O-6)    100 50 
Lieutenant Colonel (O-5)    288 70 
Major (O-4)    475 90 
Captain (O-3)    1,177 AFQa 
                   
Table 8.   Fiscal Year 2001 Promotion Opportunities. 
Source:  Major A. Madril, Officer Promotion Planner, HQMC, 23 Oct 2001, Quantico, VA.  
aAn AFQ (All Fully Qualified) board authorizes the board members to select up to 100 percent of the 
eligible population.  The eligible population consists of above-zone and in-zone officers. 
 
The number of officers that the Secretary allows a board to recommend for 
selection is based on the mission of the Marine Corps, the aggregate number of billet 
vacancies in the corresponding grades, the authorized strength of the Officer Corps, and 
the authorized grade structure of the Marine Corps.79 
3. The Precept 
To actually convene a selection board, the Secretary of the Navy must issue a 
legal document called a precept.  The precept appoints the president, members, recorders, 
and administrative personnel for the selection board.  The precept reflects information 
that the Secretary of the Navy deems important for selection of officers to the next higher 
grade.  It also sets the date and location for the selection board.  The following 
information is general guidance that is normally covered in the precept:80 
• Number of Selections authorized.  The board may select for promotion to 
the grade of (lieutenant colonel), a number of officers which most closely 
approximates 70 percent of those eligible in-zone officers.  Of those 
officers selected, not more that (10) percent may be selected from below 
the promotion zone.  The board is/is not required to select to the maximum 
number provided. 
• Selection Standard.  The board shall carefully consider without prejudice 
or partiality the record of every eligible officer.  The officers selected will 
be those officers whom a majority of the members of the board consider 
best qualified for promotion.  In addition to the standard of best qualified, 
the officers recommended for promotion by the board must be fully 
qualified; that is each officer’s qualifications and performance of duty 
                                                 
79 Ibid. 
80 Compilation of precepts from Fiscal Years 1997- 2001, provided by Major G. Branigan, Officer 
Promotion Planner, HQMC.  Interviewed by authors 23 Oct 2001, Quantico, VA. 
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must clearly demonstrate that the officer would be capable of performing 
the duties normally associated with the next higher grade.  This standard 
applies to all eligible officers, including those above and below-zone. 
• Request for Nonselection. Some promotion eligible officers may intend to 
leave active duty and therefore submit a written request not to be selected 
for promotion to the board president.  Any officer who submits such a 
request will still be considered for promotion and will incur a failure of 
selection if not recommended for promotion by the board. 
• Marital Status.  The marital status of an eligible officer or the 
employment, educations, or volunteer service of a spouse will not be 
considered. 
• Minority Officers.  The board’s evaluation of women and minority 
officers must afford them fair and equitable consideration. 
• Limited Duty Officers.  The board’s evaluation of officers who were 
formerly limited duty officers must afford them fair and equitable 
consideration. 
• Joint Duty Assignments.  The quality of performance of officers who have 
served in or are serving in joint duty assignments shall be given the same 
weight as quality of performance in assignments within the Marine Corps. 
• Acquisition Specialist.  Of particular value to the Marine Corps are 
officers experienced in the systems acquisition process.  Officers who gain 
experience through acquisition tours provide the Marine Corps acquisition 
process a unique combination of both operational experience and technical 
acquisition leadership.  The board shall give equal weight to quality of 
performance by officers in these key billets as is given to quality of 
performance in primary specialties, including operational and command 
assignments.81 
• Skill Guidance.   Within the board’s charter to select those officers who 
are best and fully qualified, the board shall give due consideration to the 
needs of the Marine Corps for officers with particular skills.  At this time 
the needs of the Marine Corps reflect a critical shortage (below 85 
percent) of officers in the grade of (lieutenant colonel) in the following 
skill areas: 
 
                                             NUMBER     PERCENT SHORT OF 
               MOS         SKILL                   SHORT            REQUIREMENT 
          0202          Intelligence               36                            33 
 
                                                 
81  Section 1731 of title 10, U.S. Code directs that officers from the Acquisition Corps are expected to 
be promoted at a rate not less than the rate for all line officers of the same Armed Force.  Consequently, the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps must submit, in the board report, a statistical analysis of the selection 
rate for acquisition officers in accordance with DODInst 1320.4 and DODInst 1320.14. 
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Because the Marine Corps promotes unrestricted officers in one by 
category and not by primary military occupational specialty, there is no 
quota established for the selection of officers in those primary 
occupational specialties; however, each board will make every effort to 
consider the needs of the Marine Corps for officers with these particular 
skills when determining those best and fully qualified for promotion.  
The precept may also include additional guidance on delineating career patterns, 
professional military education, equal opportunity, joint duty assignments, and 
consideration of limited duty officers.  
A review of the “Colonel through Captain Promotion Plans” from fiscal years 
1997 through 2001 revealed that many of the same MOSs were considered critically short 
in multiple years.  The following tables illustrate the trend that was encountered, 
beginning with Table 9 which shows the MOSs that were critically short from fiscal years 
1997 through 2001: 
 
Skill     FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 
Logistics   9904a  CS CS CS CS  
Ground 9906b CS CS 
Judge Advocate 9914 CS CS 
 
Table 9.   Critically Short (CS) MOSs For Promotion to Colonel from FY97 To 
FY01. 
Source:  Major A. Madril, Officer Promotion Planner, HQMC, 23 Oct 2001, Quantico, VA 
a Unrestricted officers holding a primary MOS from combat service support Occupational Fields 04, 11, 10, 
15, 60 or 66 will be assigned an MOS 9904 upon promotion to the grade of colonel. 
b Unrestricted officers holding a primary MOS from Occupational Fields 01, 02, 03, 08, 18, 25, 26, 34, 40, 
43, 58, 72, or 73 will be assigned MOS 9906 upon promotion to the grade of colonel 
 
Table 10 illustrates the MOSs that were critically short for promotion to lieutenant 












Skill MOS FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 
Adjutant 0180     CS 
Intelligence 0202 CS CS CS CS CS 
Logistics 0402 CS CS    
Communication Info. Systems 0602  CS CS CS CS 
Engineer 1302 CS   CS CS 
Communication 2502 CS CS    
Signals Intelligence 2602 CS     
Ground Supply 3002     CS 
Financial Management 3404 CS    CS 
Data Systems 4002 CS     
Public Affairs 4302 CS CS CS CS CS 
Judge Advocate 4402 CS     
Military Police 5803     CS 
Aircraft Maintenance 6002 CS CS CS   
Aviation Supply 6602  CS    
Pilot VMA AV-8B 7509   CS CS CS 
Pilot VMFA F/A-18 7523 CS     
Pilot VMAQ/ EA-6B 7543 CS CS CS CS CS 
KC-130 Aircraft Commander 7557 CS CS CS CS CS 
 
Table 10.   Critically ShoRT (CS) MOSs for Promotion to Lieutenant Colonel From 
FY97 To FY01. 
Source:  Major A. Madril, Officer Promotion Planner, HQMC, 23 Oct 2001, Quantico, VA 
 
Table 11 illustrates the MOSs that where critically short for promotion to major 
from FY97 to FY01. 
Interestingly enough, the fact that skill guidance was placed in the precept did not 
guarantee that Marines in that MOS would be promoted at a better rate then Marines 
whose MOS was not critically short.  In fact, as Table 12 reveals, the MOSs that were 
noted as being critically short often received promotion rates that were less than the 






Skill MOS FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 
Adjutant 0180     CS 
Intelligence 0202 CS CS CS CS CS 
Communication Info. Systems 0602  CS CS CS CS 
Engineer 1302 CS CS CS CS CS 
Tank and AAV 18XX   CS   
Communication 2502 CS     
Signals Intelligence 2602 CS   
Ground Supply 3002      
Financial Management 3404 CS CS   CS 
Public Affairs 4302 CS  CS  CS 
Military Police 5803 CS     
Aircraft Maintenance 6002     CS 
Aviation Supply 6602     CS 
Air Command and Control 7202 CS     
Pilot VMFA F/A-18 7523      
Pilot VMAQ/ EA-6B 7543 CS CS    
KC-130 Aircraft Commander 7557 CS CS   CS 
Pilot CH-53 A/D Qualified 7564 CS CS    
Pilot HMA AH-1 7565 CS CS    
 
Table 11.   Critically Short (CS) MOSs For Promotion to Major From FY97 to FY01. 
Source:  Major A. Madril, Officer Promotion Planner, HQMC, 23 Oct 2001, Quantico, VA 
 
 Colonel 
Brd Rate CS Rate
LtCol 
Brd Rate CS Rate
Major 
Brd Rate CS Rate
Fiscal Year 97 .45 .42 .66 .7 .77 .75 
Fiscal Year 98 .42 .57 .68 .63 .79 .75 
Fiscal Year 99 .43 .38 .67 .72 .81 .86 
Fiscal Year 00 .44 .54 .67 .64 .84 .9 
Fiscal Year 01 .85 .87 .47 .59 .64 .65 
 





Promotion opportunity is a manpower management tool to control the flow of 
officers between grades.  While the Marine Corps would prefer to promote all fully 
qualified officers to the next grade, grade table constraints imposed by law and promotion 
opportunity/timing guidelines resulting from DOPMA do not permit fully qualified 
promotions to all grades.  The resultant Marine Corps policy is to promote the “best and 
fully qualified.”  The question for Marine leaders now to ponder is what constitutes the 
“best.”  If the Marine Corps needs a Marine with a logistics skill, but promotes a Marine 
who is an infantry officer, has the promotion system provided the best Marine? 
To explore this question, this research examines how the other branches of the 
military promote their field grade officers.  It would be merely an academic point to 
consider promotions below the grade of major because all services conduct fully qualified 
boards to the rank of captain.  These fully qualified promotion boards select 
approximately 98 percent of the eligible officers.  The next chapter discusses the 
promotion process used by the United States Navy. 
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III. THE OPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 
OFFICER PROMOTION PROCESS 
This chapter examines the mechanics of the United States Navy officer promotion 
process.  The Navy officer promotion process is particularly relevant to this thesis 
research because it has been statutorily linked to the Marine Corps promotion process 
since the Act of 23 June 1938, which mandated a promotion by selection system for both 
services.82  The chapter begins with a historical review of the Navy officer promotion 
system and details how it evolved into a different system than that currently employed by 
the United States Marine Corps.  The chapter will continue with a detailed analysis of the 
promotion process of officers in the grades of lieutenant commander, commander, and 
captain as these grades equate to the field grade officers of the Marine Corps.  The 
information provided to describe the current promotion system reflects knowledge gained 
by interviews with key officers from the Navy’s Military Personnel Plans and Policy 
Division, as well as lecture material provided by Navy Manpower Analysts at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  The section on the promotion process includes a short discussion of 
the Navy’s “SPOT” promotion program, which allows for temporary promotions to the 
grade of lieutenant commander in order to address critical shortages in designated billets. 
A. HISTORY AND STATUTORY BASIS 
1. Equity, Efficiency and Economy 
From the very establishment of the United States Navy, three value premises 
informed the development process of the officer personnel and promotion systems: 
equity, efficiency, and economy.83  These value premises were so prevalent in every 
problem-solving effort of officer personnel that any gap between expected and actual 
results was measured by the value that a decision maker placed on one or all of them.  
Equity meant the protection of rights and prerogatives of individual officers.  
Officers were widely perceived to have dedicated their lives to the service of their 
                                                 
82 Legislation: Personnel Situation,” Marine Corps Gazette, May, 1934, pg. 18. (qtd, in Simanikas, W. 
C. The U.S. Marine Corps Officer Promotion System:  An Assessment of Factors Affecting Promotion to 
the Field Grades.  Thesis. George Washington University, 1966. pp. 24-27.) 
83 Chisholm, Donald.  Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes: Origins and Developments of the U.S. Navy’s 
Officer Personnel System 1793-1941.  Stanford University Press.  Stanford, CA 2001. pp. 28 – 29. 
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country and an officer’s commission, therefore, carried a status approximating a right.  
After appointment by the President and approval by the Senate, an officer could hold his 
commission for life, unless of course, a court of inquiry or court martial found him guilty 
of misconduct or criminal behavior.84   
Efficiency referred to what is actually considered “effectiveness” today.  With 
regard to the actions and operations of the Navy, efficiency was understood to mean the 
ability to bring about desired results in the accomplishment of the Navy mission, while 
simultaneously minimizing the loss of life and/or material.85  For the officer personnel 
system, efficiency meant recruiting men with the proper mental and physical attributes, 
educating and training them with the right skills, developing their careers appropriately, 
and ensuring that the right officers with the right skills were in the right grades and billets 
at the right time to devise the Navy’s strategies and tactics and to man its ships.86 
Economy meant minimizing aggregate cost--as opposed to maximizing the 
benefit for a given cost.  It underscores the reality that from the earliest Congressional 
debates, a naval establishment was considered to be a great burden to the treasury.  Many 
preferred not to have a Navy at all, while others desired to have the cheapest Navy 
possible.  Some wanted a Navy only if it could be shown that it was absolutely 
necessary.87 
From the establishment of the Navy, there were always a few reform-minded 
officers for whom efficiency was the only premise worth entertaining as the basis for the 
officer personnel system.  All of the Navy’s organizational components, including officer 
personnel rules and procedures, had to contribute to the Navy’s fighting ability or they 
were useless.  Most officers, however, were predisposed to favor equity as the most 
important value premise in the promotion system.  It was difficult, indeed, for an officer 
to accept the sacrifice of his career for what others judged to be the good of the service, 
                                                 
84 Ibid. p. 29. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. p. 30. 
87 Ibid. 
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especially when that individual was not confident that the process was entirely 
equitable.88 
2. The Seniority System 
Seniority was informally adopted as the most equitable system of promotion 
because it avoided the pitfalls of political or personal influence and it rewarded those 
officers who had earned the right of promotion by virtue of their length of service.89 
The criterion that the seniority system employed was clear and readily measured.  
It removed the need for competition, jealousy or injured feelings, and reduced the threat 
of favoritism.   
The problem with the seniority system, as articulated in 1801 by Secretary of the 
Navy Robert Smith, was that a rigid seniority system was incapable of bypassing those 
who are incapable of rising to a higher level of command and responsibility.90  During his 
eight-year tenure as Secretary of the Navy, Robert Smith would attempt to change the 
premise of promotion from equity to efficiency. 
Secretary Smith’s philosophy was that promotion should be made on the basis of 
merit and experience, and that in the case of individuals with equal merit and experience 
the most senior in terms of original appointment should be promoted first.  Smith 
successfully implemented a merit system of promotion from midshipman to lieutenant, 
but due to political considerations was unable to change the seniority system for the 
higher ranks.91 
Under Secretary Smith, a precedent of promoting individuals for heroic deeds was 
established.  A combat victory promoting the national interest would ensure for the 
commanding officer of a naval vessel immediate promotion to the next higher grade.  In 
cases wherein a commanding officer was already a captain, his first lieutenant could 
expect the exemplary promotion.92 
                                                 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. p. 29. 
90 McKee, Christopher. A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Naval 
Officer Corps, 1794-1815.  Naval Institute Press. Annapolis, MD. p. 275.  
91 Ibid. p. 277. 
92 Ibid. pp. 298-299. 
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The concern with Secretary Smith’s merit promotion system was that it lacked 
equity.  Master Commandant James Lawrence argued that the promotion of one 
subordinate officer in a victorious ship, when all of the officers had behaved “with signal 
but equal brilliance,” was detrimental, if not destructive, to morale among the officers 
who were not promoted.93 
Many senior officers were specifically concerned about merit promotions from 
master commandant to captain.  To understand this concern better, it would be helpful to 
visualize the promotion system in terms of a ladder that is much narrower at the top than 
at the bottom.  Throughout the early years of the Navy the ladder only had four rungs: 
midshipman, lieutenant, master commandant, and captain.94  If a junior officer was 
promoted to captain a senior officer could not regain his relative seniority, no matter how 
great a deed he might perform, because captain was the Navy’s highest rank.95 
3. Congressional Intervention  
The Navy’s understanding and representation of its officer promotion problems 
reached new levels in the mid 1800s.  The Navy had become increasingly complex 
because of the differentiation in types of ships, organization of squadrons, and the larger 
shore establishment.  Executive orders were now insufficient for the overhaul of the 
Navy, and legislation would be required to manage many of the personnel and promotion 
issues.96 
Congress took little action to deal with officer personnel problems until 1842.  
Although legislative expertise on naval problems was inadequate, the nation was not at 
war and many in Congress approached policy issues concerning the Navy with the value 
premise of economy.  Prior to 1842, existing law allowed the president to appoint 
midshipmen and make promotions when he desired,97 but in 1842 Congress sought to fix 
the number of officers in law to control the cost of the naval establishment.98  
                                                 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. p 271. 
95 Ibid. pp. 298-300. 
96 Chisholm. p 133. 
97 These appointments were still subject to Senate approval. 
98 Chisholm. p 135. 
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On 4 August 1842, President Tyler signed a bill that limited the number of 
officers in the Navy and effectively implemented a vacancy-driven promotion system.  
Though some in Congress thought they had effectively dealt with personnel problems, 
stagnation in the promotion process indicated that they had only exacerbated difficulties 
with the system and guaranteed more problems for decades to come.99 
Congress established the Bureau system on 31 August 1842.  Then Secretary of 
the Navy Abel P. Upshur came to the conclusion shortly after taking office in 1841 that 
the organization and administration of the Navy needed revising.  He noted in his first 
annual report to Congress that the Secretary had to devote so much time to trivialities that 
he had little time for more important matters.  Unfortunately, Secretary Upshur’s ideas on 
how to solve the problems of reorganization were vague.  It remained for a young naval 
officer, Matthew Fontaine Maury, to state the case for reorganization clearly.  Maury 
argued for distributing the work of the Navy Department among a number of bureaus 
along functional lines and the need of officer specialists to supervise the work of the 
bureaus. 100  The Bureau system was established with five Bureaus:  
• Bureau of the Navy Yards and Docks 
• Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair 
• Bureau of Provisions and Clothing 
• Bureau of Ordinance and Hydrography 
• Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.101 
Even during the early discussions leading up to the bureau system, there were 
differences in opinion as to the number of Bureaus needed.  Advances in science and 
technology indicated the need for more specialization than provided.  With the outbreak 
of the Civil War, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles recommended additional Bureaus.   
Accordingly, Congress, on 5 July 1862, created eight Bureaus in place of the 
original five:  
• Yards and Docks 
• Equipment and Recruiting 
                                                 
99 Ibid. pp 185-186. 
100 Furer. p. 196. 




• Construction and Repair 
• Steam Engineering 
• Provisions and Clothing 
• Medicine and Surgery.102 
By 1889, all naval personnel matters were being handled by the Bureau of 
Navigation.103  
4. The Line and Staff Officer 
By 1890 the Navy was faced with the quintessential question of equity, what 
defines a “naval officer?”  The naval officer had been for years embodied by the line 
officer that handled the navigating, sailing, and fighting.  Implicit in that personification 
was a definition of naval officer that was predicated on the technology that prevailed at 
the foundation of the Navy: ships powered by wind and sails and whose heavy 
equipment—anchors, sails, and cannon—were operated by muscle and sweat.   
The Navy had subsequently recognized the need for various staff specialists such 
as surgeons, chaplains, naval constructors, paymasters, mathematicians, and engineers 
who provided expertise that the line officer did not possess.  Initially, these staff officers 
were not accorded relative rank to line officers, but in an institution where just about 
everything—pay, housing, position at mess tables, uniform—was determined by rank, to 
be without it was to be “penniless in the current coin of the naval realm.”104 
The line-staff conflict came to the forefront of promotion problems when the 
Navy began to adopt the technology of steam power.  As ships came to depend on 
mechanical power the naval engineers, unlike other staff, were integrally involved in 
operating the ships.  Engineers chafed about their inferior standing and unlike the other 
staff officers, they had the ability to cause trouble for the line officers.  The facts of 
                                                 
102 Ibid. p. 199.  
103 When World War II broke out, the Bureau had become an agency devoting practically its entire 
attention to personnel administration, although the Naval Observatory and the Hydrographic Office still 
came under its cognizance.  Shortly thereafter, these were placed under the Chief of Naval Operations and 
in 1942 the name of the Bureau was changed to the Bureau of Naval Personnel.  Five primary elements 
composed its administrative responsibilities: procurement; training; distribution; performance; and welfare 
of naval personnel. Furer. p. 265. 
104 Chisholm. p. 421. 
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separate line and engineer corps, uniforms, pay scales, methods of recruitment, and later, 
educational curricula, exacerbated the conflict to the point where it eventually spilled 
over and played itself out in the public press and Congress.  Although played out as a 
conflict between opposing groups, the controversy really concerned how the profession 
of naval officer would be defined.  The Navy was becoming such a complex organization 
that no generalist officer, no matter how talented, could be expected to adequately 
perform the specialized tasks required while, conversely, staff officers were increasingly 
discontent with their relegation to a second-class status, without rank or command 
authority.105  
While the Navy attempted to reconcile issues of equity among the line and staff, 
then Secretary of the Navy Hilary A. Herbert attempted to resolve the problem of 
stagnation in the promotion of line officers.  Secretary Herbert’s first report to Congress 
stated “that unless remedies are adopted looking to some system of promotion which will 
produce a regular flow from the bottom to the top of the list, the consequences, not only 
to the service, but also to the Government, will soon be nothing less than alarming.”106  
Secretary Herbert was interested solely in efficiency, believing that any promotion 
system should “produce efficient commanding officers, the accomplishment of which 
necessitates that officers of the line be made to bear the responsibilities of actual 
command by or before the time they have reached the prime of life; while they are still 
young enough to accommodate themselves to the demands upon intellect and energy 
which are made by the assumption of control of a modern man-of-war.”107 
Secretary Herbert testified before Congress on 1 March 1894, and outlined a plan 
to establish a distribution of officers.  If annual attrition did not provide promotions 
according to this plan, the president could accept applications for voluntary retirement 
from officers in the senior grades.  If voluntary retirements did not create the specified 
vacancies, the secretary would appoint a board of at least five admirals to recommend a 
number to be retired equal to the vacancies required.  Promotion would remain seniority-
                                                 
105 Ibid. pp. 435-436. 
106 Ibid. p. 409. 
107 Ibid. 
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based, contingent upon officers passing professional examinations.  “Selection out” was 
to be used, not to cull inefficient officers, but to facilitate the flow of promotion.108 
Rear Admiral J. G. Walker, the Bureau of Navigation Chief, gave an alternate 
proposal to Congress a week later.  Walker provided that promotion from junior 
lieutenant on up be accomplished by a form of selection.  “Selection up” would be 
achieved by boards meeting in June and December, comprising five officers senior to the 
grades from which selections were to be made.  Their decisions were to be based upon 
each officer’s records.  Only officers “best fitted in all respects for the duties of the next 
higher grade, irrespective of seniority” were to be selected.  This appears to be the first 
time the term “best fitted” was used.109  Walker’s proposal, although not enacted, 
prefigured changes in the promotion system that would not occur until more than twenty 
years later, when much investigation and controversy had passed. 
5. The Act of 3 March 1899 
The Act of 3 March 1899 was the most far-reaching reorganization of officer 
personnel since the Navy’s inception.110  The purpose of the Act was to “harmonize the 
differences which justly or unjustly have existed for more than a quarter of a century 
between the different officer corps; to remedy the present stagnation in the lower grades 
of the service, by providing a healthy flow of promotion, and to prevent its 
recurrence…and otherwise increase the efficiency of the Navy.”111   
Under the terms of the Act, rank was conferred on all staff officers, as determined 
by their commissioning date and academy standing.112  The Act increased the number of 
captains and commanders in the Navy and accelerated the promotion of officers to those 
grades.  It provided that when there were less than forty yearly vacancies above 
lieutenant, twenty of which had to be above lieutenant commander and thirteen above 
commander, a board of naval officers would create the necessary additional vacancies by 
selecting officers for transfer to the retired list.  This method for ridding the active list of 
the least fit and insuring a flow of promotions became known as the “plucking” system.  
                                                 
108 Ibid. p. 412. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. p. 463 
111 House Report No. 1375, 55th Congress, 2nd Session, 19 May 1898, p. 2. (qtd in Chisholm, p. 456). 
112 House Record, 17 January 1899. pp. 708-9. (qtd in Chisholm, pp. 459-460). 
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It worked well as long as there were notoriously unfit officers available for selection-out, 
but after ten years that type of officer had been pretty well eliminated and officers then 
had to be plucked who had passable, even good, service records and reputations.  This 
system became so unpopular in the Navy and also in Congress, that it would barely 
survive the turn of the century.113 
6. The Line Personnel Act of 1916   
World War I brought about a massive fleet expansion in the Navy and forced 
momentous changes in its officer personnel system.  Then Secretary of the Navy 
Josephus Daniels, who proved to be a great naval reformer, was tasked with generating 
the qualified personnel—defined in terms of skill and relative youth—essential for 
commanding the Navy’s modern, growing fleet.114   
Secretary Daniels endorsed a paper that had been written in 1912 by Judge 
Advocate General Ridley Mclean that called for a new system of promotion to “enhance 
economy, stimulate efficiency, and utilize the most efficient officers in the most 
responsible positions, and utilize every officer in the position for which his attainments 
best qualify him.”115   
Mclean believed that the existing promotion system gave too much consideration 
to the welfare of the individual officer and too little to the interest of the government.  
What was necessary was a deliberate, unprejudiced answer to the question of what form 
of promotion system would most greatly improve the fighting efficiency of the Navy.116 
The Line Personnel Act of 1916 answered the question by providing the pivotal 
legislation the Navy sought to increase its organizational efficiency.  It provided that all 
promotions to command grade (commander, captain, and rear admiral) would be by 
selection, and directly tied promotion to attrition.  It based staff officer promotions on the 
                                                 
113 Furer, Julius A. Administration of the Navy Department in World War II.  Washington 1959. p. 
296. 
114 Chisholm. p. 555. 
115 McLean Ridley.  Promotion by Selection. House Report No.119. p. 4309. (qtd in Chisholm, p. 
584). 
116 Chisholm. p. 584. 
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percentage of total line officers, and thereby ensured that they would always be promoted 
in accordance with the officers of the line.117  
7. Promotion by Selection 
Promotion by selection was an important provision because it assumed that 
command grades should be filled by the most competent officers, those “best fitted,” 
rather than assuming that all that was needed for an officer to be promoted was some 
threshold level of competence.  It also assumed that officers who were more than 
adequate in the junior grades would not necessarily be competent to the senior grades’ 
duties.  This in turn required that the Navy develop a more complex representation of 
each grade’s duties and the skills required to perform them.118   
Selection boards were convened annually for the selection of line officers, with 
separate boards consisting of senior officers in the staff corps convened for making 
selections in those corps.  Staff officers became eligible for selection when their running 
mates in the line had reached that point.  Vacancies were filled as they occurred, and in 
the order of the selectees on the list.  If an officer became ineligible before he was 
actually promoted he could be removed from the list.119   
The Act of 23 June 1938, later applied the system of promotion by selection to all 
officers in the naval service.120  The effect of this Act on the promotion system was that 
beginning in the grade of lieutenant commander, about one of every five officers in each 
grade would be eliminated.  This elimination was necessary to preserve the required 
distribution of officers and to maintain the proper age levels in each grade.121 
The Act of 23 June 1938 also statutorily linked the promotion systems for the 
Navy and Marine Corps.  Discussion of how the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, the 
Officer Grade Limitations Act of 1954, and the Defense Officer Personnel Management 
Act affected the officer promotion processes of the Navy were discussed in Chapter II.  
The focus of attention in this chapter will, therefore, shift to the operation of the current 
U. S. Navy promotion process.                                                    
117 Ibid. pp. 585-587. 
118 Ibid. p. 591. 
119 Furer. p. 296. 
120 “The Selection Law,” Marine Corps Gazette, March, 1939 p. 34 (qtd. in Simanikas, pp. 30-31). 
121 House Report, 1947, p. 1647. (qtd in RAND p. 93). 
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B. THE CURRENT U. S. NAVY PROMOTION PROCESS 
1. Officer Community Structure 
The Navy groups its officers into four general categories: unrestricted line; 
restricted line; staff corps; and limited duty (line and staff)/chief warrant (line and 
staff).122  Within these four categories, the officer structure is divided into twenty 
communities,123 i.e., groups of officers with related education, training, skills, and 
experience.  Promotions in the Navy are a function of these communities, based on 
requirements, vacancies, and legal limitations.  Community management for officers is 
conducted by Officer Community Managers (OCMs).  Their primary responsibilities are: 
• Promotions 
• Accessions and Resignations 
• Balance between billets and available personnel 
• Community Structure (pay grade balance in billets and inventory) 
• Career milestones 
• Compensation 
• Professional development requirements 
• Policy Coordination: recruiting, retention, training, DOPMA124 
Figure 4 illustrates the officer community of the Navy by competitive category 
and designator: 
                                                 
122 Unrestricted Line are officers of the line of the regular Navy and Naval Reserve who are not 
restricted in the performance of duty.  Restricted Line are officers of the line of the regular Navy and Naval 
Reserve who are restricted in the performance of duty by having been designated for aviation duty, 
engineering duty, aerospace engineering duty, or special duty.  Staff Corps Officers are divided into eight 
categories in the Navy and Naval Reserve.  The eight staff corps categories are medical, dental, medical 
service judge advocate general, nurse, supply, chaplain, and civil engineer.  Limited Duty Officers and 
Chief Warrant Officers are appointed to occupational and technical fields based on their previous 
experience.  Manual of Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications. NAVPERS 158391. p. A-2. 
123 The words “Community” and “Competitive Category” are used interchangeable throughout this 
chapter.  While it is noted that the common use of the word community in the Navy refers to members in 
the Unrestricted line, (Aviation Community, Submarine Community, etc..), the Manual of Navy Officer 
Manpower and Personnel Classifications refers to the twenty groups as competitive categories, while the 
Bureau of Personnel, (www.bupers.navy.mil/mpt/planning.process.community.management.htm), refers to 
the groups as communities.   




Figure 4.   Officer Community Overview. 
Source: LCDR Dave Lemek, Officers Plans and Policy, N131F 
a Includes Medical Corps, Dental Corps  Nurse Corps, and Medical Service Corps 
 
2. Participants in the Promotion Process 
There are two key organizational elements when considering the Navy officer 
promotion process: Officer Plans and Policy Section, which is designated as Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) N131, and is part of the Military Personnel Plans and Policy 
Division; and Personnel Progression, Performance, and Security Department, which is, 
designated PERS-8 and falls under the cognizance of the Commander Navy Personnel 
Command.  The important distinction between the two offices is that Officer Plans and 
Policy deals with promotion planning and management, whereas PERS-8 convenes 
promotion boards and implements promotion policy.125 
                                                 
125 OPNAVINST 5400 Series 4 Oct01.  Chart provided by NPS. 
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To develop this thesis the authors had several discussions with the staff at Officer 
Plans and Policy.  It was clear from these discussions that promotion planning in the 
Navy is in part a management tool for structuring the Navy and for ensuring that 
sufficient personnel are available to meet manpower requirements.  It was also clear that 
efficiency was the primary value premise for the promotion system, but that equity had 
not been abandoned. 
3. Promotion Policy 
The Department of the Navy (DoN) policy is to meet skill and experience 
requirements for officers in each grade and competitive category by using a system of 
competitive selection boards.  The promotion system is based on five-year plans designed 
to meet the following objectives: 
• Select numbers of officers to fill projected vacancies to meet authorized 
strength in each competitive category and grade for the first fiscal year of 
the plan. 
• Ensure reasonable career opportunities in each competitive category 
• Attain and maintain an all Regular Force on the active-duty list in the 
grades of lieutenant commander (O-4) and above. 
• Maintain programmed requirements by grade in each competitive category 
over the latter four fiscal years of the plan while maintaining relatively 
similar career opportunities.126 
4. Promotion Opportunity 
Department of Defense Instruction 1320.13 establishes the general guidelines that 
will be applied to promotion plans for each competitive category.  It requires a relatively 
similar opportunity for promotion over a five-year period.  Secretary of the Navy 
Instruction 1420.1A provides the promotion flow point and opportunities for each grade 
in the Navy.  Table 13 illustrates these opportunities and flow points for lieutenant 
commander (LDCR), commander (CDR), and captain (CAPT).  Particular attention 
should be paid to the promotion opportunity, as it will be a salient point in this 
discussion. 
 
                                                 
126 SECNAVINST 1420.1A.  Promotion and Selective Early Retirement of Commissioned Officers on 








Promotion Flow Point 
in years of active 
commissioned service
LCDR 70 – 90               9 - 11
CDR 60 – 80              15 - 17 
CAPT 40 – 60              21 - 23 
 
Table 13.   United States Navy Promotion Opportunity and Flow Points. 
Source:  SECNAVINST 1420.1A, 8 Jan 1991. p. 4.127 
 
Promotion opportunity for the Navy, which is the in-zone “possibility” of 
selection, is a function of three interdependent factors:  the total number of officers in the 
competitive category; the promotion flow point, which is the number of years of 
commissioned service experienced before promotion to a higher rank; and the selection 
rate, which is the percentage of officers authorized to be selected divided by the number 
of officers in the promotion zone.128  Promotion zones are established to meet the 
separate promotion requirements of each competitive category, and this often results in 
different flow points and opportunity among the competitive categories.129  The 
percentage of officers that may be recommended for promotion in each competitive 
category is set forth in the Secretary of the Navy’s Precept. 
Table 14 reflects a compilation of the authorized selection percentages of officers 
in the grades of captain for fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002.  The reader will 
note that with the exception of the medical and dental corps, there were nine occasions in 
the five-year period that the promotion opportunity for the unrestricted line was less than 
the promotion opportunity for another community.130 
This point will be particularly important in Chapter six, when attention is turned 
toward whether or not any of the promotion systems studied could be applied to the 
                                                 
127 Promotion flow point and opportunity for any competitive category may be temporarily set outside 
these guidelines when necessary to attain or to maintain the authorized grade strength.  SECNAVINST 
1420.1A. p. 5. 
128 Hansell R. C. Officer Promotion Opportunity Within the Navy Unrestricted Line 1973 – 1979.  
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School.  June 1979. 
129 SECNAVINST 1420.1A 8 Jan 1991. p. 11. 
130 The Medical Corps and the Dental Corps are not accountable under the Defense Officer Personnel 
Management Act, and therefore the guidelines for promotion opportunity percentage and promotion flow-
point do not apply.  
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Marine Corps. The Unrestricted Line equates to the Combat Arms specialties of the 
Marine Corps, and any proposed system that does not examine how changes will affect 
the “war-fighters” of the Corps will be given little consideration.  The basic concern of 
Marine leaders would be the effect on the Marine Corps war-fighting culture if there was 
a perceived disparity in the promotion process.   
Competitive Category  FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 
Unrestricted Line 60 50 60 57 57 
Engineering Duty Officer 55 55 55 55 55 
Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer (Engineering) 50 50 50 50 52 
Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer (Maintenance) N/A 50 50 50 50 
Special Duty Officer (Cryptology) 50 N/A 50 50 60 
Special Duty Officer (Intelligence) 50 50 50 50 57 
Special Duty Officer (Public Affairs) 62 66 50 60 71 
Special Duty Officer (Oceanography) 50 50 50 50 45 
Limited Duty Officer (Line) 30 30 30 30 43 
Civil Engineer Corps 50 50 45 51 55 
Chaplain Corps 50 50 50 50 50 
Judge Advocate General Corps 60 60 60 60 60 
Dental Corps 85 80 75 75 80a 
Medical Corps 70 70 70 70 85 
Medical Service Corps 50 50 50 55 60 
Nurse Corps 50 50 45 45 50 
Supply Corps 50 50 50 50 50 
Limited Duty Officer (Staff) N/A N/A 33 50 N/A 
 
Table 14.   Authorized Selection Percentages for Promotion to the Grade of Captain 
for Fiscal Year 1998 through Fiscal Year 2002. 
Source: For fiscal years 1998 – 2000, LCDR D. Lemek, Officer  Plans and Policy (N131F) 
For fiscal years 2001 – 2002, Secretary of the Navy Precept Convening Promotion Selection 
Boards to Consider Officers on the Active Duty List of the Navy for Promotion to the Permanent 
Grade of Captain. 
www.bupers.navy.mil/pers8/pers-80/pers-801/pers-801.htm 
aThe precept for this board was not available on the web site, however, the actual selection rate was 
available and is reflected.  Since the board may only recommend the percentage in the precept and is tasked 
with recommending the percentage that most closely approximates the percentage set forth in the precept, 
this number should be a good approximation of the SECNAV guidance. 
bItems listed as “N/A” refer to years when no individuals were in the primary zone for promotion and a 
selection board was not conducted. 
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Table 15 reflects a compilation of the authorized selection percentages of officers 
in the grades of commander for fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002.  The reader 
will note that with the exception of the medical and dental corps there were fourteen 
occasions in the five-year period when the promotion opportunity for the unrestricted line 
was less than the promotion opportunity for other communities. 
 
Competitive Category  FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 
Unrestricted Line 70 70 75 70 75 
Engineering Duty Officer 70 70 70 70 75 
Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer (Engineering) 83 80 80 80 80 
Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer (Maintenance) 70 70 70 70 70 
Special Duty Officer (Cryptology) 70 70 70 70 70 
Special Duty Officer (Intelligence) 70 70 70 70 77 
Special Duty Officer (Public Affairs) 85 84 89 80 78 
Special Duty Officer (Oceanography) 70 65 65 70 65 
Limited Duty Officer (Line) 50 50 50 60 65 
Civil Engineer Corps 70 65 70 70 80 
Chaplain Corps 50 50 50 55 60 
Judge Advocate General Corps 80 80 75 70 70 
Dental Corps BFQa 85 80 80 80 
Medical Corps BFQa 85 80 80 90 
Medical Service Corps 70 70 70 70 70 
Nurse Corps 70 70 70 70 70 
Supply Corps 70 70 70 75 80 
Limited Duty Officer (Staff) 50 40 40 40 50 
 
Table 15.   Authorized Selection Percentages for Promotion to the Grade of 
Commander for Fiscal Year 1998 through Fiscal Year 2002. 
Source: For fiscal years 1998 – 2000, LCDR D. Lemek, Officer Plans and Policy (N131F) 
For fiscal years 2001 – 2002, Secretary of the Navy Precept Convening Promotion Selection 
Boards to Consider Officers on the Active Duty List  of the Navy for Promotion to the Permanent 
Grade of Captain 
www.bupers.navy.mil/pers8/pers-80/pers-801/pers-801.htm 
a BFQ is “best and fully qualified” 
Table 16 reflects a compilation of the authorized selection percentages of officers 
in the grades of lieutenant commander for fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002.  The 
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reader will note that even with the exception of the medical and dental corps there were 
twenty-four occasions when the promotion opportunity for the unrestricted line was less 
than the promotion opportunity for another community.  
 
Competitive Category  FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 
Unrestricted Line 70 70 80 85 90 
Engineering Duty Officer 90 90 90 95 90 
Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer (Engineering) 90 90 90 90 N/A 
Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer (Maintenance) 80 80 80 80 90 
Special Duty Officer (Cryptology) 80 80 80 80 85 
Special Duty Officer (Intelligence) 80 80 80 80 90 
Special Duty Officer (Public Affairs) 83 84 85 85 85 
Special Duty Officer (Oceanography) 85 80 80 80 90 
Limited Duty Officer (Line) 70 70 70 80 85 
Civil Engineer Corps 70 65 70 75a 85 
Chaplain Corps 60 60 65 70a 75 
Judge Advocate General Corps 85 85 85 80 80 
Dental Corps 100 100 100 100 100 
Medical Corps 100 100 100 100 100 
Medical Service Corps 70 70 70 70a 75 
Nurse Corps 80 80 80 80a 85 
Supply Corps 75 75 75 75a 80 
Limited Duty Officer (Staff) 70 60 70 70a 85 
 
Table 16.   Authorized Selection Percentages For Promotion to the Grade of LCDR 
for Fiscal Year 1998 through Fiscal Year 2002. 
Source: For fiscal years 1998 – 2000, LCDR D. Lemek, Officer Plans and Policy (N131F) 
For fiscal years 2001 – 2002, Secretary of the Navy Precept Convening Promotion Selection 
Boards to Consider Officers on the Active Duty List  of the Navy for Promotion to the Permanent 
Grade of Captain. 
www.bupers.navy.mil/pers8/pers-80/pers-801/pers-801.htm 
aThe precept for this board was not available on the web site, however, the actual selection rate was 
available and is reflected.  Since the board may only recommend the percentage in the precept and is tasked 
with recommending the percentage that most closely approximates the percentage set forth in the precept, 
this number should be a good approximation of the SECNAV guidance. 
When asked about differences in promotion opportunity, promotion planners from 
Officer Plans and Policy noted that Navy instructions call only for a “relatively similar 
promotion opportunity” and that it was acceptable for members of different competitive 
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categories to have promotion opportunities on different ends of the promotion 
opportunity spectrum, but that every attempt was made to ensure that across competitive 
categories promotion opportunity remained within the variance outlined in the 
Department of Defense and Secretary of the Navy guidelines.  They further stated that the 
goal of the promotion system is the efficiency of the Navy; but that prior to any argument 
of inequity based on promotion opportunities, individuals must have a full understanding 
of how promotion opportunities influence the size of the promotion zone.131 
5. Promotion Zones 
Promotion Zones in the Navy are determined by taking the number of authorized 
promotions per competitive category and dividing that number by the promotion 
opportunity percentage.  Since the number of promotions by competitive category is 
fixed, based on vacancies, a higher promotion opportunity percentage results in a smaller 
zone, while a lower opportunity results in a larger zone.  Composition of the zone is 
determined by lineal seniority and is independent of year grouping.  Consider the 
individuals in Table 17 with an 1140 designator.  The individuals may have the same 
promotion date but the individual who has a high lineal standing has a high opportunity 
to be selected for promotion in fiscal year 2003, while the individual who is in that same 
competitive category with a low lineal standing will have to wait an additional year to 
reach the zone. 
                                                 
131 Video Teleconference Conducted with Commander T. McMahon and LCDR D. Plans and Policy 
on 4 Dec 2001. 
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57% 59% 60% DES IGNATOR NAME Command S tart Date
3 3 3 1110 TOP OF ZONE
3 3 3 1110 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES
3 3 3 1310 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES VF-14 9912
3 3 3 1140 W ILLIA M S, M ICHA EL
3 3 4 1320 THOM A S, GEORGE SW A TSLA NT 9912
3 3 4 1310 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES VFA -15 0001
3 3 4 1310 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES
3 3 4 1310 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES VT-7 0103
3 3 4 1110 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES
3 3 4 1310 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES HT-8 0009
3 3 4 1320 VA SQUEZ, SCOTT
3 4 4 1320 ROBERTS, BENJA M IN
3 4 4 1320 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES
3 4 4 1310 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES
3 4 4 1110 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES
3 4 4 1110 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES
3 4 4 1110 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES
3 4 4 1110 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES
3 4 4 1320 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES VS-30 0008
3 4 4 1320 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES VA Q-135 9906
3 4 4 1320 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES
3 4 4 1310 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES VFA -192 0002
3 4 4 1310 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES VP-5 9906
3 4 4 1310 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES HC-4 9806
3 4 4 1310 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES VC-8 9808
3 4 4 1320 HA TCH, W ILLIA M
4 4 4 1140 CRA W FORD, A LICE
4 4 4 1320 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES VA Q-142 9807
4 4 4 1320 SM ITH, JOHN JA M ES VA Q-137 9809




Table 17.   Illustration for Determining Zone Sizes. 
Source: LCDR D. Lemek, Officer Plans and Policy. (N131F) 
6. Promotion Flow Point 
The promotion flow point is the average years of service when an officer is 
promoted (paid) to the next higher grade. Promotions are made in the order in which the 
names of officers appear on the promotion list for each competitive category according to 
a standard phasing plan.  Five percent of officers are promoted each month for the first 
five months and 15 percent of officers are promoted in the final four months of the fiscal 
year.  Promotions of officers from one competitive category are effected regardless of the 
relative seniority of officers of the same grade in other categories.   
The reason the phasing plan is important is that it ensures that the flow point for 
actual promotions are still relatively similar.  Consider again the individuals with the 
1140 designator in Table 16, and specifically consider the zone with a 60 percent 
opportunity.  Michael Williams is at the bottom of the promotion zone and his promotion 
will be effected on 1 September 2003.  Alice Crawford will not be selected until the next 
promotion board but because she is at the top of the zone her promotion will be effected 1 
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October 2004.  The reality is that although Alice Crawford has had to wait an additional 
year to find out if she will be selected for promotion, if she is promoted her flow point is 
still relatively similar to her counterparts in her community. 
Table 18 illustrates how the promotion opportunity translates to a promotion flow 
point in the given communities.  It also offers evidence that promotion planners can 
adjust promotion opportunities while providing relative equity across competitive 
categories.  Although there are several occasions when communities are promoted faster 
than the “war-fighting” community there is no indication of glaring inconsistencies 
among communities. 
 










Unrestricted Line 57 21 - 07 75 15 - 06 90 10 – 02 
Engineering Duty Officer 55 21 - 09 75 15 – 10 95 9 – 09 
Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer (Engineering) 52 21 - 02 80 15 – 04 N/A N/A 
Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer (Maintenance) 50 21 – 08 70 16 - 01 80 9 – 00 
Special Duty Officer (Cryptology) 57 21 – 01 75 15 – 05 87 10 – 08 
Special Duty Officer (Intelligence) 57 21 – 01 77 15 – 07 90 9 – 00 
Special Duty Officer (Public Affairs) 71 20 – 07 78 14 - 09 85 9 – 08 
Special Duty Officer (Oceanography) 45 22 – 02 65 16 – 02 95 9 – 00 
Limited Duty Officer (Line) 43 22 – 10 65 15 – 09 85 9 – 08 
Civil Engineer Corps 55 20 – 11 80 15 – 08 80 9 – 10 
Chaplain Corps 50 22 – 03 60 16 – 11 75 10 – 10 
Judge Advocate General Corps 60 21 – 01 70 16 - 06 80 10 – 07 
Dental Corps 75 23 – 01 80 16 – 05 100 9 – 03 
Medical Corps 80 21 – 07 85 16 - 06 100 10 – 00 
Medical Service Corps 60 20 – 10 70 16 - 05 75 10 – 06 
Nurse Corps 50 23 – 00 70 15 – 07 85 10 – 00 
Supply Corps 50 21 – 04 80 15 – 00 80 9 – 11 
Limited Duty Officer (Staff) N/A N/A 50 16 – 04 85 10 – 03 
 
Table 18.   Promotion Percent Opportunity and Flow Point in Years and Months. 
Source:  LCDR D. Lemek, Officer Plans and Policy (N131F) 
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7. Temporary (Spot) Promotion of Officers 
Title 10 United States Code authorizes the temporary (spot) promotion of certain 
line lieutenants to the grade of lieutenant commander under regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary of the Navy, when those officers have a skill in which the Navy is critically 
short and when they are serving in a position (billet) designated to be held by a lieutenant 
commander.  Unrestricted line officers on the active duty list and limited duty officers in 
the surface duty and submarine duty designators who possess the skills required for 
lieutenant commander billets as engineer officers, engineering department principal 
assistants, engineering material officers in afloat units, and other staff engineering billets 
that directly support fleet engineering readiness are eligible.132 
To be considered for a spot promotion, officers must have served two years in 
grade by the date the selection board meets to consider the officer for promotion.  They 
must be serving in, or ordered to, one of the 325 billets that are designated for spot 
promotion by the Secretary of the Navy and must have at least one year remaining to 
serve in a qualifying billet following the date of the commanding officer’s 
recommendation for spot promotion.133   
Officers selected for spot promotion are appointed to the temporary grade of 
lieutenant commander effective on the date they report to the qualifying billet or the date 
of Senate confirmation of the appointment, whichever is later, and is the effective date for 
entitlement to pay and allowances.  Appointments remain in effect until termination of 
appointment due to: 
• An officer’s promotion to the permanent grade of lieutenant commander 
• A modification of orders that terminates eligibility 
• Commencement of process for release from active duty134 
The importance of spot promotions are that they can effectively increase the 
percentage of the unrestricted line that are promoted, particularly when the individual 
who takes the spot promotion would not otherwise be in a promotion zone. 
 
                                                 





The biggest difference between the promotion systems of the Navy and the 
Marine Corps is not with the mechanics of the systems.  In fact, with the exception of the 
Navy’s spot promotion program, the manner in the Navy promotes its unrestricted line is 
in essence a mirror image of the Marine Corps promotion system.  The underlying 
differences in the systems reside in the dichotomy of thought as to the purpose of the 
promotion system. 
The Navy decided at the turn of the century that an effective promotion system 
must serve both the organization and the individual and that the promotion system must 
carry a portion of the responsibility for determining force structure.  They sought a 
system that ensured that adequate numbers of officers were available to fill vacated 
positions throughout the Navy.   
The literature clearly demonstrates that the Navy chose efficiency of the 
organization over equity of the individual.  The Marine Corps has not made such a 
decision with its promotion system.  The charter of every selection board for the Marine 
Corps is to choose the “best and fully qualified,” while giving due consideration to the 
needs of the Marine Corps.  If the purpose behind the Marine Corps system was to 
change to give more consideration to force-structuring then perhaps the standard would 
be to choose the “best fitted and most fully qualified.” 
The Navy has been successful in developing a dynamic promotion system, which 
has evolved to meet the needs for the organization.  The real question is whether or not 
the Navy is similar enough to the Marine Corps for the promotion system to work in the 
Marine Corps? That will be a question answered in a later chapter, after analysis of the 






IV. THE OPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 
PROMOTION PROCESS 
The objective of this chapter is to explain the United States Army officer 
promotion process.  The Army promotion process is an important aspect of the Army’s 
Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS).  The chapter will describe the OPMS 
and provide a historical perspective of the Officer Personnel Management System.  The 
chapter will then discuss how the OPMS has been restructured to adapt to the changing 
military strategies of the post cold war.   
A. THE OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
The Army’s OPMS is responsible for managing officer personnel to fill billet 
requirements with the right person at the right time while fostering an environment 
conducive to advancement and equal opportunity.135 The OPMS is regulated by the U.S. 
Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), Officer Personnel Management 
Directorate (OPMD), and the U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM).  
Collectively, these three entities work together to ensure that the OPMS does the 
following: 
• Access and designate officers in the right numbers and with the right skills 
to satisfy current and projected Army requirements 
• Develop the professional capacities of officers through planned schooling 
and sequential, progressive assignments 
• Assign officers to meet Army requirements 
• Separate officers to meet individual and Army needs136  
To better understand the Army’s current promotion system, which is one of 
several components of the OPMS, a brief history of the OPMS is provided.      
B. OPMS HISTORY     
The Army officer corps underwent a significant expansion as a result of World 
War II.  The initial strength of 17,563 officers in 1940 grew to 835,400 officers in 1945. 
There was not much officer management during this time; the emphasis was essentially 
                                                 
135 Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management, Department of the Army Pamphlet 
600-3, 1998, p. 1. 
136 Ibid. p. 2. 
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to identify and commission officers, provide them minimum essential training, and then 
send them off to war.  By 1948, demobilization had reduced the Army officer corps to 
64,000.137  
To support the Korean War, officer strength nearly doubled to a peak of 133,900 
in 1952. However, postwar demobilization quickly reduced the officer corps to near 
prewar levels when a large number of officers left the Army.  During this period, 
development for the officer corps was again limited to that which directly supported the 
war effort.138 
Flexibility in meeting officer increases to support the Vietnam War was limited 
by the decision not to mobilize the reserve component.  Officer Candidate School became 
the major source of junior officers, partly because of the draft, and partly because the 
antiwar movements on many campuses caused several Reserve Officer Training Corp 
(ROTC) programs to be reduced in scope or terminated. 139    
There was general recognition by Congress, DoD, and the military services during 
the Vietnam era that major changes to officer personnel management were required, 
which ultimately led to the DOPMA. The Army, however, took interim action; it 
recognized the need to improve internal officer management and conducted a major 
study—the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) of 1971.140   
The purpose of the study was to develop a “new concept of officer personnel 
management”141 that would “establish the professional and personal standards and goals 
required for the officer corps of the modern volunteer Army.”142 The guiding philosophy 
of OPMS was to: 
 
                                                 
137 George R. Iverson, “Officer Personnel Management: ‘A Historical Perspective.’” Defense 
Technical Information Center, May 1978, pg. iii. (qtd. in Harry Thie et al., Future Career Management 
Systems for U.S. Military Officers, pg. 268. www.rand.org/ publications/MR/MR470/mr470.appd.pdf). 
138 Harry Thie et al., Future Career Management Systems for U.S. Military Officers, p. 268, 
www.rand.org/ publications/MR/MR470/mr470.appd.pdf. 
139 Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Army Historical Summary, 1 July 1972 to 30 June 1973,” 
p. 33. (qtd. in Thie et al., p. 268). 
140 Thie et al., p. 269. 
141 Department of the Army, “Officer Personnel Management System,” 1971, p. 1. (qtd in Thie et al., 
p. 269). 
142 Ibid. p. A-1. 
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• Improve the professional climate of the officer corps 
• Identify early and develop carefully officers most qualified for command 
• Allow for specialization in some technical areas without undue restriction 
on promotion and schooling opportunities 
• Provide a satisfying career for that large segment of the officer corps who 
are neither commanders nor specialists.143 
The changes resulting from this study began to shape Army officer management 
as early as 1972.  From 1972 to 1974, the Army implemented a centralized command 
selection process, designated command tours, and mandated primary and secondary  
specialties for officers.144   
After the DOPMA was passed in 1981, the Army Chief of Staff directed a study 
on the DOPMA’s effect on the OPMS.  In order to meet the DOPMA requirements, 
additional changes were made to the OPMS from 1983 to 1985, which included single 
branch development,145 functional areas not related to any branch, multiple career tracks, 
and a revised officer classification system.146 
After the Cold War, members of Congress and leaders in the DoD began to 
question the effectiveness of the military career management system, which had been 
shaped by the military strategies of the Cold War; not the turbulent period that followed.  
In June of 1996, General Dennis J. Reimer, Chief of Staff of the Army stated, “It’s now 
time to take a holistic view of the OPMS processes and systems as we know them today.” 
At that time, the Army created the OPMS XXI Task Force, to “review and revise the 
personnel management system as necessary to ensure its viability for meeting future 
challenges.”147   
C. OPMS XXI TASK FORCE 
The OPMS XXI is the result of the task force-recommended changes to the 
OPMS.  With the future strategic environment in mind, changes were required to meet 
the following criteria:  
                                                 
143 Future Career Management Systems for U.S. Military Officers, MR-470-OSD, 1994, p. 269. 
144 OPMS XXI: What Does it Mean for Your Future? 1997, p. 1 
145 A branch is an occupational category, like Infantry, Artillery, Finance, etc. 
146 OPMS XXI: What Does it Mean for Your Future? 1997, p. 1. 
147 Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management, Department of the Army Pamphlet 
600-3, 1998, p. 7. 
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• Enhance the Army’s warfighting capability 
• Provide all officers with a reasonable opportunity for success 
• Balance grades and skills at the field-grade level148   
The following information provides a synopsis of the task force methodology and 
findings as written in The Officer Personnel Management System XXI Study of 1997. 
1. Career Issues      
During their year-long study, the task force conducted a survey, which indicated 
that officers were concerned about career issues such as security, competitive 
assignments, “zero defects” mentality related to fitness reports, high operational tempo, 
quality-of-life compensation, and too many career requirements with too little time to 
meet them.  The survey also noted the impression that officers on the “command track” 
(those with a warfighting background) were favored by promotion boards over officers 
with technical and skill-related backgrounds.149  Survey results showed concern over high 
officer turnover between jobs, and a lack of experience in functional areas.150    
The task force attributed these concerns to three manpower issues, which were 
closely examined: disparities between officer authorizations and inventory, officer 
authorization changes driven by changes in law or policy over the past decade, and 
chronic structure-inventory mismatches caused by the way the Army accesses officers 
and distributes them to the branches.151  The task force noted that these three factors 
resulted in the organizational problems of inventory mismatches, billet shortages in the 
operational units, inverted pyramid structures, and burdensome officer development 
requirements.152   
2. Inventory Mismatches 
The Army had an excess of company-grade officers even after the numbers were 
deducted for trainees, transients, holdees, and students (TTHS).  This is similar to what 
the Marine Corps calls P2T2, prisoners, patients, trainees and transients.  The Army was 
short of 3,500 field-grade officers after considering TTHS.  As a result, company-grade 
                                                 
148 Officer Personnel Management System XXI Study, 1997, p. xi. 





officers, most of which were not branch-qualified, filled those vacant field-grade 
billets.153  This problem is commonly referred to as upward substitution and usually 
means that an under-experienced officer is filling a billet requiring a higher-ranked 
officer.154 
3. Billet Shortages in Operational Units 
Exacerbating upward substitution was the increase in Joint and DoD field-grade 
billets that started in 1988,155 as well as the passage of Title XI Active 
Component/Reserve Component (Title XI AC/RC).  Title XI AC/RC is a congressionally 
mandated program developed to ensure that the reserve component is being trained in the 
same manner as the active component.156  Since Joint/DoD and Title XI AC/RC billets 
need to be filled at or near 100 percent, operational units with lower fill priorities suffer 
from billet vacancies.   
The resultant dilemma of these policies is that majors who have minimum branch-
qualifying experience, which is usually about one to two years in their functional areas, 
are taken out of operational units to fill the Joint/DoD and Title XI AC/RC billets.  This 
hindered officers’ experience levels and posed problems for unit cohesion.157 
4. Inverted Pyramid Structures 
Grade pyramidal structures are usually broad-based and narrow at the top.  The 
problem that Army manpower planners faced is that not all career fields had a normal 
pyramidal structure.  Table 19 provides the distribution differences between various job 
categories.  It illustrates that the combat arms field required more officers at the company 
grade level than at the field grade level.  This is in stark contrast to the branch-immaterial 
field, which required more field grade officers than company grade officers.    
 
 
                                                 
153 A branch qualified officer is one who is mentally and physically able to perform a variety of 
assignments in his/her current branch and is well-rounded as a leader.  The officer must typically serve in 
his/her respective branch for a minimum amount of time, which varies between one and two years. 
154 Officer Personnel Management System XXI Study, 1997, pp. 4-6. 
155 Ibid. 
156 TRADOC Regulation 351-18, The Army School System, 1999, p. 31. 
157 Ibid. pp. 4-7. 
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  Company Field 
  Grade Grade 
Combat Arms 54 31 
Combat Support 21 17 
Combat Service Support 16 18 
Branch-Immaterial 9 34 
 
Table 19.   Distribution Percentage of Army Officers in 1996. 
Source. OPMS XXI Task Force Study, 1997 
To compensate for a lack of field grade billets, field grade officers in the combat 
arms field were normally used to bolster shortages in the other fields.158  The first OPMS 
(1971) was “challenged to design an officer management system to accommodate an 
Army structure in which some branches and career fields had inverted authorization 
pyramids,”159 which resulted in the Army accessing 57 percent into combat arms when 
less than 25 percent of the colonel billets required combat arms officers. The solution was 
for all officers to have two specialties—a primary combat arms specialty into which they 
were accessed and in which they served their early assignments, and a secondary 
specialty that was selected after several years of service.160 The goal was that by the 
eleventh or twelfth year of service each officer would be “branch qualified” in both 
specialties and be flexible in job assignments based on the Army’s needs. 
The Army’s dual-track system, which closely resembled the Marine Corps 
Supplementary MOS program, failed to work according to plan.161 Before choosing a 
secondary specialty, officers would look at promotion results in that specialty. Career 
patterns of promoted officers were studied to identify the type of assignments that were 
prevalent. If certain types of assignment (duty with the reserves, recruiting assignments, 
ROTC duty, teaching at service schools, etc.) were common among selected officers, the 
type of assignment was considered “career enhancing” and selected. The converse was 
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also true. This behavior enhanced the perception of ticket punching and of careerists 
whose behavior was focused on self-aggrandizement rather than service to the Army.162  
Another problem was that the Army still wanted “generalists” with broad 
experience under the dual-track system, but at the same time required each officer to 
achieve a higher level of competency in two specialties. With longer assignments and 
more overseas tours, it was difficult for officers to remain qualified in both specialties, 
attend appropriate military schools, obtain an advanced degree, and meet other 
requirements.163 The Army, recognizing this situation, introduced primacy, which allows 
officers to emphasize career development in one area. Typically, however, officers would 
change primacy from an entry branch to a functional area in mid-career when a branch-
related assignment became less likely.164 
5. Burdensome Officer Development Requirements 
Officer development requirements were a burden to many officers seeking to get 
promoted.  In the combat arms field especially, getting all the “checks in the boxes” for 
promotion was difficult.165  Because there were so many officers trying to get their 
command time and branch-qualifying time, the time they did get was divided into smaller 
pieces.  Essentially more officers got less of everything.166  As previously mentioned, 
majors with the minimum branch-qualifying time were eligible to fill the Joint/DoD and 
Title XI billets.  In order to fill these high priority billets, the Army had to decrease 
minimum branch-qualifying times, thereby causing officers to move in and out of billets 
more rapidly.  The problem, of course, is that minimized branch-qualifying time was not 
conducive to increasing the Army’s warfighting capabilities.167  
D. OPMS XXI  
This new OPMS, titled “OPMS XXI,” entailed several changes to the officer 
management system, specifically it:  
• Grouped branches and functional areas into four distinct career fields 
• Established a career field designation process                                                  
162 Thie et al., p. 278. 
163 Ibid. p. 273. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Officer Personnel Management System XXI Study, 1997, pp. 4-10. 
166 Ibid. pp. 4-12. 
167 Ibid. pp. 4-13. 
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• Assigned majors and above to one career field 
• Established a career field-based promotion system 
• Established a command selection system which prioritizes officers in the 
Operations Career Field168 
The primary change in OPMS XXI was a new career field-based officer 
development and management system for field grade officers.169  The career field-based 
system recognizes that all jobs are not alike and are now regarded differently in the 
promotion process.  The system also recognizes that some officers are better suited for 
certain jobs than others based on skills, background and education.  A unique 
characteristic of the career field-based system is that upon a captain’s selection to major, 
his/her record is forwarded to a career field designation board, where his/her career field 
will be assigned based upon various criteria, such as demonstrated performance, 
undergraduate or graduate training, technical or unique expertise, military experience or 
training, in-depth understanding of a foreign culture, and consideration of the officer as a 
whole person.170  Two key elements in the designation process are the officer’s 
preference and the rater’s input on the officer’s evaluation report.  Table 20 illustrates the 
new career fields according to OPMS XXI.   
Operations (OP): 69 percenta Operations Support (OS): 14 percent 
Sixteen Basic Branchesb    Foreign Area Officer   
Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs Army Acquisition Corps 
Multifunctional Logistician      
Information Operations (IO): 7 percent Institutional Support (IS): 10 percent 
Information Systems Engineer Human Resource Management 
Strategic Intelligence Comptroller   
Space Operations   U.S. Military Academy Instructor 
Public Affairs   Operations Research and  
Information Systems Management Systems Analysis   
Simulation Operations Strategic Force Development 
    Nuclear Research and Operations 
      Strategic Plans and Policy 
 
Table 20.   OPMS XXI Career Fields. 
Source: OPMS XXI Task Force Study, 1997 
a Percent of total Army Competitive Category 
b Infantry, Armor, Artillery, Adjutant, Engineer, Signal, Quartermaster, Special Forces, Transportation,  
Intelligence, Military Police, Medical, Finance, Aviation, Ordnance and Air Defense 
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170 Officer Personnel Management System XXI Study, 1997, pp. 5-4. 
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The Army competitive category is now divided under OPMS XXI.  Under the old 
competitive category, combat arms officers would compete for promotions against 
officers in other fields like Public Affairs, Comptroller and Information Systems 
Management.171  Now promotions are based within a career field.  For example, officers 
in the Operations career field will only compete against other officers in the Operations 
field. 
Since command time is important for promotion yet difficult for all officers to 
attain, the OPMS XXI has designated command selection for officers in the Operation 
career field only.  The intended advantage to the OPMS XXI is that more command time 
will be available for those in the Operations field and consequently those officers in the 
other career fields can spend more time developing their skill and experience levels in 
their specialties.172   
Just as importantly, the lack of command time will not hinder those officers in the 
other three career fields.  Whereas in the past, promotion to colonel was highly unlikely 
unless battalion command had been obtained, now the Operations Support, Information 
Operations, and Institutional Support career fields will enjoy the same likelihood for 
promotion to colonel as the Operations field will enjoy.173  The disadvantage to the 
Operations career field is that because colonel promotions will be evenly distributed 
across all the career fields, the Operations field will experience fewer promotion 
opportunities to colonel than what the operational occupations were previously 
accustomed to.174  Despite career field changes in the Army Competitive Category, the 
actual selection board process will remain the same. 
E. CENTRALIZED PROMOTION SELECTION BOARD PROCESS       
The officer promotion selection system is governed by procedures based on 
statute (Title 10, United States Code), Army Regulation (AR 600-8-29, Officer 
Promotions), and policy established by the Secretary of the Army and the Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Personnel.  The selection system is closely monitored and managed because 
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of the far-reaching effects that the selection process has on the mission of the Army, and 
the professional development, morale and well-being of the officer corps.175 
Though the Army Competitive Category is divided into four career fields, there 
remains only one annual selection board. The centralized selection process has been in 
place since the end of the Vietnam War.   It is considered by many to be a fair system that 
carries out board guidance well.176  Surveys performed by the task force studying the 
OPMS in 1997, showed that 80 percent of the respondents agreed that the promotion 
boards select the officers with the best records.177    
The basic concept of the promotion selection system is to select for promotion 
those officers who have demonstrated that they possess the professional and moral 
qualifications, integrity, physical fitness, and ability required to successfully perform the 
duties expected of an officer in the next higher grade.  Promotion is not intended to be a 
reward for long, honorable service in the present grade, but is based on overall 
demonstrated performance and potential abilities.178 
Promotion selection is conducted fairly and equitably by boards composed of 
mature, experienced, senior officers.  Each board consists of different members, and 
women and minority members are routinely appointed.  A typical board is presided over 
by a general officer and consists of 18-21 officers in a grade senior to that of those being 
considered for promotion.  The board membership reviews the entire performance portion 
of the official record of every officer being considered for promotion.  Selection boards 
recommend those officers, who in the collective judgment of the board, are the best 
qualified for promotion.179 
F. PROMOTION CULTURE SHIFT      
Though the promotion selection process is perceived to be fair by most officers, 
the career field based system has caused concern for many officers:  the Army’s “muddy 
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boots” culture is being replaced with a technology-dominated culture.180  The “muddy 
boots” culture is characterized by basic soldiering, almost synonymous with the Marine 
Corps’ “Every Marine a rifleman.”  The technology-dominated sub-culture allows 
officers to stovepipe in a specific skill at the expense of general warfighting skills.  
The “muddy boots” culture was supported by the dual-track system because it 
allowed the Army to retain a surplus of combat arms officers.181  Under this system, an 
infantry officer, for example, could maintain his primary “track” of infantry, while 
delving in and out of an alternate “track,” which was usually a branch that was lacking 
manpower.  The infantry officer would most likely try to spend more time in his primary 
branch of infantry to improve his promotion potential.   
Career-field designation can be perceived as a step away from “muddy boots” in 
that once an officer is promoted to major, the officer is locked in to one of the four career 
fields.182  No longer would an infantry officer who was redesignated out of the combat 
arms be allowed to go back to his primary branch.  However, career-field advocates claim 
that the “muddy boots” culture is instilled in officers during their first 10 years of service 
before promotion to major.183  This is the time when they have more exposure to leading 
troops, gaining branch-qualification, and operational experience. Additionally, the field 
grade billets in the three non-operational career fields will still be predominantly filled by 
the over-abundance of officers from the Operations career field, and specifically from the 
four combat arms branches.184  Thus, even the specialist fields will be filled 
predominantly by those who have been indoctrinated in the “muddy boots” culture.      
G. SUMMARY   
The OPMS XXI has taken measures to develop its warfighting capability to adapt 
to emerging technological changes in the future.  By recognizing the differences between 
warfighters and specialists, cultural changes may develop. Because promotion 
opportunities are to improve for non-operational career fields, those officers might 
perform at higher levels since more time will be afforded for skill development.  On the 
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other hand, operational career fields might feel more slighted than specialists whose less 
“well-rounded” performance records are guaranteed opportunities for promotion by 
virtue of their career field.  If such a system were adopted by the Marine Corps, this 
could be a major concern because any perceived imbalance in promotion equity, could 
hinder the cohesion of the Marine Corps and team building might suffer in the long run.  
Successful recruiting over the past decade shows that individuals are attracted to the war-
fighting culture of the Marine Corps.  For this reason, an impact to the Marine Corps’ 
culture may be greater than an impact to the cultures of the other services.  This idea will 
be addressed again in the final chapter.   The next chapter will describe the operation of 
the United States Air Force promotion process.   
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V. THE OPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 
OFFICER PROMOTION PROCESS 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the Air Force officer promotion process.  
The Air Force and Marine Corps promotion systems are similar in that they both have a 
“best qualified” promotion standard, and the Air Force’s large competitive promotion 
category for the Line of the Air Force closely parallels the Marine Corps aggregate 
promotion System. The promotion histories of the two services are also similar in that 
certain war-fighting occupations, such as the Corps combat arms officers and the Air 
Force’s pilots, have fared better in promotions than other support fields.  
The chapter begins with a historical review of the Air Force officer promotion 
system and continues with a detailed description of the current promotion system.  The 
chapter concludes by highlighting similarities and differences between the Air Force and 
Marine Corps systems. 
Several names identifying the Air Force in this chapter will be used, so for the 
sake of clarity, the following Air Force lineage is provided: 
1926 – Birth of the United States Army Air Corps 
 
1941 – United States Army Air Corps re-designated the United States Army Air 
Force  
 
1947 – United States Army Air Force reestablished as the United States Air Force 
 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1. The Army Air Corps 
In 1926, the Army officially recognized aviation as a military specialty and 
created the Army Air Corps.185  Army Corps were created when a certain function or 
specialty reached a sufficient size and importance. Corps enjoyed the benefits of 
autonomy and the loyalty of their personnel.  Officers were actually commissioned into 
the corps of their specialty and not the Army.  The Air Corps was created under laws that 
required all general officers and flying unit commanders to be rated pilots and pilots to 
                                                 
185 Mitchell, Vance O. Air Force Officers Personnel Policy Development 1944-1974.  Air Force 
History and Museums Program, United States Air Force.  Washington DC, 1996. p. 1. 
 74
compose at least 90 percent of the Air Corps.186 The downside for the Army Air Corps 
was that rank distribution and promotion opportunity were not comparable to the rest of 
the Army, a ground-oriented service.187   
Between the years of 1926 and 1941, promotions were slow and based on 
seniority and years of service.188  The Air Corps did not have a proportional share of 
colonels and generals and in the mid-1930s, only 12 percent of the Air Corps officers 
were field-grade, while the overall Army average was 40 percent.  Also, Attempts at 
gaining a separate promotion list for the Air Corps were futile. This, in part, motivated 
the Air Corps to seek complete autonomy from the Army. 189      
Since pilots composed the Air Corps, other Army branches conducted almost all 
officer support functions, up until 1941.  For example, the Army Signal Corps handled 
communications and the Army Ordnance Corps handled bombs.190  The arrangement 
between the Chief of the Air Corps and the other Army Corps’ commanders became 
difficult due to the constant demand for support personnel, especially during a time of 
war.  In order for the Air Corps to work properly with adequate support personnel, the 
Air Corps had to grow its own support structure.191  This was a key factor in the Air 
Corps argument for autonomy and in June of 1941, the Army Air Corps was changed to 
the Army Air Force, which meant that it had equal status with the Army Ground Forces 
and Army Service Forces.192   
2. The Army Air Force 
The Army Air Force faced the challenge of acquiring and producing officers with 
various skills, flying and non-flying, to completely support itself without the assistance of 
other Army Corps.193  To meet this challenge, those statutes requiring 90 percent of the 
officers to be pilots were suspended and the Army Air Force opened new commissioning 
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programs to meet the officer manpower needs.194  Despite these programs, however, the 
Army Air Force would still have to rely on other Army Corps to meet various shortfalls 
for years to come.195   
General of the Army, Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General of the Army Air 
Forces from 1942 to 1946 envisioned an Air Force that was an independent military 
service, completely separate from the Army.  He also envisioned a technologically 
advanced Air Force that would be a key player in future wars.  In a staff meeting on 
January 12, 1945, he shared his vision: 
Regulations limiting the responsibilities and career possibilities of non-
rated personnel must be changed.  Every opportunity must be given to 
skills and abilities needed for a well rounded organization if the United 
States is to maintain its air leadership.196 
Up to the time of his vision, the pilot had always been regarded as the epitome of 
heroism and professionalism.  General Arnold’s vision to accept non-rated officers as 
equals and to allow them the same opportunities for advancement as rated officers 
challenged the Air Force culture.197  It also required Air Force planners to agree upon 
what the correct balance of rated and non-rated officers should be. 
In November of 1945, the Army Air Force established a 70:30 ratio of rated and 
non-rated officers.198  This ratio allowed a 20 percent surplus of rated officers, which 
would be used to give rated officers broader experiences in non-rated billets.  Since many 
pilots had little experience outside of flying, cross-training was viewed as establishing a 
well-rounded officer.199  The surplus of pilots was also considered important to meet the 
demands of a future mobilization.  In case of a mobilization, it was far easier to replace a 
non-rated billet with a reservist than it was to create a well-trained pilot.200  There were 
however, problems with the 70:30 ratio. 
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With so many surplus pilots, flight hours became a scarce resource and minimum 
proficiency levels were difficult to attain.  Some officers did whatever they could to meet 
the minimum requirements and in 1945 when a B-25 bomber crashed into the Empire 
State Building the media uncovered the practice of officers claiming flight hours while 
simply being passengers.201   
Congress had a problem with the 70:30 ratio because flight pay seemed 
unnecessary for rated officers serving in non-rated billets.  Also, there were simply too 
many pilots per aircraft, a ratio of five pilots to each plane.202  This seemed an 
unnecessary expense for Congress and by 1947 it began substantially cutting the Army 
Air Force budget on account of a bloated rated officer population.203  
Not wanting Congress to come up with any more solutions to Army Air Force 
problems, the Army Air Force officially dropped the 70:30 ratio, although its manpower 
practices continued to indicate that 70:30 was the Army Air Force guideline.   
Interestingly enough, although the Army Air Force was attempting to balance its 
service between rated and non-rated officers, it did exactly the opposite by creating more 
rated officers than it really needed, which would latter make equity difficult for future 
non-rated officers. 
Regarding promotions, pre-World War II promotions were seniority based and 
contributed to officer professionalism problems.  Because promotions were so few and 
far between, many officers felt little incentive to work hard or advance themselves as 
professional officers.  This was evident in the lack of good leadership during World War 
II.204   
During World War II many senior officers were forced to retire while promising 
young officers were given early promotions.  By 1946 it was obvious that the Army Air 
Force needed to develop an officer management system that would attract qualified 
officers and respond to national needs.  This new system was addressed in the Officer 
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Personnel Act (OPA) of 1947, which mandated promotion by selection to the next grade 
at mandated points of a career. 205 
In August 1947 the OPA became law but its emphasis on a competitive up-or-out 
promotion system did little to reduce the Army Air Force officer population.  The 
unforeseen problem with OPA was that 95 percent of the Army Air Force’s line officers 
had fewer than five years of commissioned service.206 
The Army Air Force then considered the possibility of dividing their force into 
four “sub-forces:” 
• (1) Flying 
• (2) Guided Missiles 
• (3) Antiaircraft 
• (4) Technical and service 
This division could have helped with the management of personnel and their 
career patterns; however, the Army Air Force did not want to evolve into an organization 
with different loyalties as it had experienced in the Army’s corps system.207 
3. The Air Force is Established   
The Army Air Force gained its autonomy and became the Air Force on 18 
September 1947.  The Air Force created a promotion category for the Line of the Air 
Force, which excluded only chaplains, doctors, and lawyers.208  The various career fields 
in the Line of the Air Force were as follows: 
• Aeronautical Engineering 
• Electrical Engineering 
• Automotive and Armament 
• Construction 
• Personnel Administration 
• Supply and Procurement 
• Information 
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• Flying 
• Non-flying Tactical 
The career fields were supposed to be different from the corps system in that 
officers would be commissioned into the Air Force and not their respective career fields.  
Loyalty to the Air Force was an important issue, having recently experienced loyalty 
problems as a part of the Army.  Promotions within the same category were intended to 
help unify the Air Force and build camaraderie.209  However, it appears as if a history of 
buildups, draw downs, pilot-bias, and changing technology kept the Air Force distracted 
in its attempts at camaraderie building.  
The Air Force used a best-qualified promotion system from 1947 to 1951 but then 
reverted to an all fully qualified promotion system to major and lieutenant colonel, since 
a large number World War II officers were approaching promotions to these ranks.  
Under the best-qualified system, many of the World War II officers would not have been 
selected for promotion.  The Air Force was able to switch to a fully qualified promotion 
system because the Korean War diverted the country’s attention from OPA and 
decreasing officer ranks.210  The officers who benefited the most from the fully qualified 
system were those who entered at the end of World War II.211   
By 1958, the Officer Grade Limitation Act (OGLA) restrictions required the Air 
Force to again resume a best-qualified promotion system to reduce officer numbers, 
though the only officers who weren’t allowed to continue on in the Air Force were those 
who were clearly substandard.212  Those who were considered fully qualified but not 
selected for promotion were still allowed the opportunity to serve until retirement.213  The 
up-or-out system was really only applied to those who had already reached retirement 
age, which is a significant indicator of the Air Force’s efforts to take care of its officers, 
namely pilots, at the expense of their officer management system.      
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Just as a large contingent of officers, also referred to as a “hump,” resulted from 
the World War II buildup, another occurred during the Korean War.214  In 1954, over 
40,000 officers had less than three years of service and 60,000 had between eight and 
twelve years of service, which was in conflict with steady-state manpower models.215 
The OGLA limits would have required the Air Force to involuntarily separate 
about 1,700 officers but the Air Force, concerned with possible retention problems down 
the road, sought OGLA relief in 1958 to increase the number of its majors by 5,000.  
Though only 3,000 were approved, this fixed the problem until the Air Force needed the 
same relief for its lieutenant colonels in 1961 and its colonels several years later.216 
The biggest problem that these humps caused was that Air Force promotion phase 
points lagged behind those of the other services.  Until the DOPMA, the Air Force fought 
many battles with Congress to provide grade relief and the authorizations needed to get 
its officers promoted on a more equal basis with the other services.217  These legal battles 
used up valuable resources and gave reason for the Air Force and congress to distrust 
each other’s objectives.218      
Between the years of 1963 and 1972, the Air Force saw a pilot increase of 267 
percent.219  This was similar to the World War II and Korean War build-ups in that the 
post-war reductions created turmoil for promotion planners.  Between 1973 and 1974, 
pilot accession was cut by almost 50 percent.  Afterwards, a low-morale problem existed 
in the Air Force known as the “captain’s revolt” of 1977 through 1979.  This period 
marked the lowest voluntary retention of Air Force officers in its history.220 
In 1978, President Carter began what has been referred to as the “Reagan 
Buildup,” by increasing pilot accession rates.  This was a result of tensions in various 
parts of the world like, North Korea, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, Iran, the Middle East, 
South and Central America, China, Taiwan, and other places.  However, this gradual 
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buildup was be followed by the post-Cold War drawdown, which significantly reduced 
pilot production again.221   
Because the Air Force experienced several large buildups and did not 
involuntarily separate enough officers during draw downs, the promotion system simply 
could not promote enough people to keep pace with the other services.222 
Throughout the Air Force’s history, a perception has existed that aviators are 
more important to the service than non-rated officers.  The numbers of general officers 
who are aviators as opposed to those who are non-rated officers supports this 
perception.223  This perception is an important point and its applicability to today’s Air 
Force will be addressed later in this chapter. 
Currently, the Air Force uses a best-qualified promotion system, which was 
helped along by the OGLA as it made centralization and standardization of promotion 
procedures possible.224 The problems with the OGLA were identified by the Air Force 
and proposed changes were adopted into the DOPMA.  The next portion of this chapter 
identifies the current Air Force promotion process. 
B. THE CURRENT U.S. AIR FORCE PROMOTION PROCESS 
1. Officer Community Structure     
The Air Force groups its officers into eight competitive categories for promotion 
purposes: Line of the Air Force (LAF); Judge Advocate General (JAG); Chaplain 
(CHAP); Medical Service Corps (MSC); Biomedical Service Corps (BSC); Dental Corps 
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Competitive Population Percentage of 
Category Number Population 
Line 51,684 80 
Nurse 3,703 6 
Medical / Medical Service Corps 3,350 5 
Biomedical 2,389 4 
Judge Advocate 1,266  2 
Dental 960  2 
Chaplain 589   1 
 
Table 21.   United States Air Force Population. 
Source: Air Force Personnel Center Website, Dec 2001 
Of the 51,684 line officers about 12,000 are pilots, which is significantly different 
from the 70:30 ratio after World War II.  The others are composed primarily of support 
officers, navigators, anti-ballistic missile systems officers and non-rated operation 
officers.225  The majority of Air Force officers, 81 percent, are in a competitive category 
called the Line of the Air Force.  The other 19 percent of officers form seven competitive 
categories relative to their specialized education.226  One point that was made clear when 
viewing the historical promotion demographics on the eight competitive categories is that 
the specialized categories were created to ensure that these specialists maintained a 
minimum promotion opportunity consistent with the Line of the Air Force, and not 
simply to enhance their promotion opportunity.     
The Line of the Air Force has about 40 different technical specialties, which have 
also been referred to as “tribes.” Job communities have been described as tribes because 
officers are more likely to identify with their technical specialty than they are to simply 
being an Air Force officer. 227  This is a sharp contrast to the Marine Corps, where 
officers identify with the Marine Corps before they identify with their occupational 
specialty. 
2. Purpose of the Promotion Process 
The Air Force Personnel Center, located in Randolph Texas, is the home of the 
Officer Promotions Management Section.  Their mission is to ensure that a sufficient 
                                                 
225 Air Force Personnel Website. 
226 Major C. Huguley.  Chief, Officer Promotion Management Section, HQ AFPC.  Interview by 
authors 28 Jan 2002.  
227 Developing Aerospace Leaders, John T. Correll, Air Force Magazine, December 2001, p. 1. 
 82
number of qualified personnel are available to carry out mission objectives.228  For the 
promotion system, their specific objectives are: 
• To ensure the best qualified are selected to promotion 
• To provide stable, consistent, and visible progression 
• To accelerate progression for exceptional performers229 
3. Selection Standard and Criteria 
Central selection boards are convened to consider active duty officers for 
promotion in the respective grades of captain through major general.  The requirement for 
these selection boards is that they recommend only those officers whose records, when 
compared with those of other eligible officers, reflect the greatest potential to serve 
successfully in the next higher grade.  All selection boards, use the best qualified method 
of selection.230 
The most distinct difference between the Marine Corps and Air Force promotion 
systems is the Air Force’s use of Senior Raters.  A Senior Rater is an officer in the grade 
of colonel or above, usually a wing commander, who completes promotion 
recommendations on all officers under his command who are eligible for consideration 
for promotion.  The senior rater gives a recommendation to “definitely promote,” 
“promote,” or “not promote” based on an officer’s cumulative record.  The number of 
officers who can be given a “definitely promote” recommendation is limited to a fraction 
less than the fraction who will be promoted.  Although the “definitely promote” 
recommendation is not a guarantee for promotion, statistical data show that the 
promotion opportunity for these individuals centered around 98 percent.231 
4. Promotion Planning 
Promotion Planning is the mechanism that commences the Air Force promotion 
process.  The Air Force personnel staff with approval through the Secretary of the Air 
Force prepares and updates a five-year promotion planning model.  This model takes into 
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account the projected gains/losses to Air Force officer manning along with the projected 
needs in each grades.232   
The planning mechanisms in the Air Force promotion process demonstrate their 
ability to adjust for changes in the aggregate structure but not in any particular fields.  For 
example if the Air Force needs fewer or more officers they may: 
• Increase or decrease promotion opportunity for a particular board 
• Adjust the eligible population by splitting or combining year groups 
• Slow down or accelerate “pin-on” times 
• Skip a promotion year or hold two boards in one year233 
Since none of these planning mechanisms are designed to alleviate imbalances in 
particular specialty they would not, by Marine Corps standards, necessarily meet the 
definition of a force-structuring tool.  The Secretary of the Air Force’s Memorandum of 
Instruction, which provides promotion guidance to the selection board, does identify skill 
shortages but does not mandate that these skill shortages receive any preference for 
promotion. 
The most important factor in promotion selection of an Air Force officer is job 
performance.  This is identified to be the most important factor in the other services as 
well.  A well-rounded, whole person concept is used during the selection process.  An 
officer’s record must reflect sound performance in his/her career field, a variety of jobs, 
exposure to different difficulty levels of jobs, leadership potential, and educational 
advancement.234   
5. Selection Rates 
Tables 22 and 23 illustrate that officers within the Line of the Air Force category 
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Line of the Air Force Component FY 97 FY 98 FY99  FY00 
Pilots 72.1  72.3  70 67.9 
Navigators  59 54.6 57.3 55.7 
Non-Rated Operations 57.7  60.7 59.5 64.3 
Mission Support 61  60.7 66.2  65.7 
 
Table 22.   Authorized Selection Percentages for Promotion to the Grade of 
Lieutenant Colonel for Fiscal Year 1997 through Fiscal Year 2000. 
Source: Air Force Personnel Center, Website, Dec 2001. 
    
Line of the Air Force Component FY 97 FY 98 FY99  FY00 
Pilots 45.7 45.8 48.8  49.5 
Navigators  36.2 36.7 38.8 39.6 
Non-Rated Operations  39.7 35.1 39.1  43.5 
Mission Support 41.6  41.1  39.6 45.1 
 
Table 23.   Authorized Selection Percentages for Promotion to the Grade of Colonel 
for Fiscal Year 1997 through Fiscal Year 2000. 
Source: Air Force Personnel Center, Website, Dec 2001. 
 
The tables show that pilots have fared much better on promotion boards than any 
of the other occupational fields.  This phenomenon can be mostly attributed to the 
Secretary of the Air Force’s memorandum that indicates that the Air Force has had an 
enormous pilot shortage for the past several years and it is projected to continue past the 
year 2010.235  The reader will also note that with the exception of navigators, non-rated 
officers currently experience higher selection rates than they did in 1997.  If the pilot 
shortage continues, it is likely that the non-rated officer selection rates will continue to 
rise as non-rated officers fill billets previously filled by pilots.  
6. Promotion Opportunity 
Promotion opportunity in the Air Force is the approximate percentage of officers 
in an accession year group that a central selection board will select for promotion to the 
next higher grade in any of the three promotion zones.  The DOPMA’s minimum 
opportunities are 80 percent to major, 70 percent to lieutenant colonel, and 50 percent to 
colonel.  The Air Force, in 2001 has had opportunities that reflect 90 percent to major, 75 
percent to lieutenant colonel and 55 percent to colonel.236  Promotion opportunities are 
                                                 
235 The Air Force Pilot Shortage: A Crisis for Operational Units?, William W. Taylor, S. Craig Moore, 
C. Robert Roll, Jr. RAND 2000, p. 1. 
236 Labrutta, p. 9. 
 85
generally held constant to ensure consistent quality of selects, fairness and predictable 
promotion likelihoods.237 
C. CONCLUSION 
The greatest similarity between the Air Force and Marine Corps promotion 
systems is that the Line of the Air Force closely resembles the Marine Corps unrestricted 
officer community and holds a preponderance of the officer population.  Another 
similarity is that within these competitive categories, field-grade officers are promoted on 
a best –and-fully qualified basis and well-rounded officers usually do better than those 
who have been stove-piped in specific technical specialties.   
Because of the current pilot shortage in the Air Force, many pilots are limited on 
their time outside of the cockpit.  Though many pilots lack the well-rounded career paths, 
the Air Force cannot afford to select fewer pilots for promotion.    
The greatest difference between the two services is simply in their cultures.  
Because the Air Force has focused so much on technology, officers continue to identify 
with their weapons systems before they identify with the Air Force as a whole.  This 
should be a caveat to the Marine Corps when considering changing the current promotion 
system to one that recognizes different skills.   
An interesting note is that even though the Air Force has a fairly equitable Line of 
the Air Force promotion category, the culture has a major cohesion problem simply 
because of its various specialty communities.238  It appears that the more a service 
concentrates on technical specialties, the harder it is to form a cohesive organization. 
The next chapter will explain the authors’ conclusions about whether or not the 
Marine Corps should change its current officer promotion process to an MOS based 
system.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The conclusions about whether or not the Marine Corps should modify its 
promotion system so that Marine Officers are promoted according to MOS vacancies 
instead of aggregate vacancies are based upon an understanding of the statutory 
restrictions on implementing an MOS-based system as well as an understanding of the 
costs and benefits of instigating the system. 
After discussion of the statutory provisions that would effect implementation of a 
promotion by MOS system, the authors discuss the role of value premises on a promotion 
system and contend that no force structuring tool in the Marine Corps will be successful 
until the value premise for the Marine Corps manpower system is changed.   
A. PROMOTION BY MOS 
Establishing a policy of selecting officers for promotion by Military Occupational 
Specialty (MOS) will be a difficult option for the Marine Corps from a statutory 
perspective.  Title 10, United States Code, permits the creation of separate competitive 
categories for warrant officers but requires that competitive categories for officers be 
established by the Secretary of each military department, under regulations prescribed by 
the Secretary of Defense.  
Department of Defense Directive 1320.12, “Commissioned Officer Promotion 
Program,” states that the Secretaries of the military departments shall establish 
competitive categories as required to manage, in relation to the requirements of the 
officer category concerned, the career development and promotion of certain groups of 
officers whose specialized education, training, or experience, and often relatively narrow 
utilization, make separate career management desirable.   
Secretary of the Navy Instruction 1400.1A, which governs officer competitive 
categories for active-duty members of the Navy and Marine Corps, states that a separate 
competitive category will be considered only when the following criteria are met: 
• The specialized education, training, or experience and often relatively 
narrow utilization of a group of officers makes it impossible for them to 
 88
compete for promotion on an equitable basis with other officers having 
more generalized experience. 
• It is necessary to protect a substantial investment in education, training, or 
experience by ensuring equitable promotion opportunity when that 
education, training, or experience will be utilized within a relatively 
narrow career field. 
• The specialized community can be managed as a separate career field in 
such a manner as to ensure the most efficient use of unique resources in 
the various officer grades. 
• The specialized community will be large enough to sustain a career force 
in the grades, 0-4 through 0-6, generally within the promotion guidelines 
of the Secretary of the Navy Instruction on promotion and selective early 
retirement of commissioned officers on the active-duty list of the Navy 
and Marine Corps.239 
It is not a forgone conclusion that MOSs in the Marine Corps would meet the 
standard of “specialized education, training, or experience,” and even if it were, it would 
still be difficult to argue that Marine officers in any MOS have such a “narrow 
utilization" that it becomes impossible for them to compete for promotion on an equitable 
basis.   
The reader should first understand that every Marine officer, regardless of MOS, 
must complete The Basic School, has a theoretical opportunity at command, and can 
apply for a variety of b-billet tours.  Then the reader should note, as Table 24 illustrates, 
that with very few exceptions, the five-year promotion averages for selection to the grade 
of major demonstrate a distribution of promotions that is consistent with Department of 
Defense guidelines.  The standard for promotion to major is a 70 to 90 percent promotion 
opportunity range, and a relatively similar promotion opportunity.240  Applying this 
standard as the definition of equity makes it inherently difficult to contend that it has 
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Table 24.   Average of Five-Year USMC Major Selection Rates. 
Source: Major G. Branigan, Officer Promotion Planner, HQMC 
1 This MOS has not existed for five years. 
 
Notwithstanding the concerns of the current language in creating the competitive 
categories, if the Secretary of the Navy were to determine that the technical training of 
the varied MOSs meets the Department of Defense requirement for separate competitive 
categories, and the Marine Corps was given the flexibility of separate promotion 
requirements as a force structuring tool, the Marine Corps could, in the long run, develop 
the ability to provide a more efficient fill of officer billets.  However, other manpower 
processes would have to be completed to ensure that the system worked in an efficient, 
yet equitable manner. 
The first necessary prerequisite to adjusting the Marine Corps promotion system 
would be a verification of authorized billet requirements and a concrete decision on how 
b-billets would be distributed per MOS.  Equity would mandate that b-billets be 
distributed at a fixed proportion of MOS strength so as not to allow any particular MOS 
from arbitrarily increasing its end-strength and consequently its promotion opportunities. 
The short-run implication of implementing an MOS-based system in accordance 
with Department of Defense Instruction 1320.12 must be noted before that decision could 



















be reached.  It is DoD policy to provide relatively similar promotion opportunities over a 
five-year period in each grade and competitive category.  Table 25 provides the fiscal 
year 2002 primary military occupational specialty (PMOS) demographics for the major 
selection board.  The table illustrates how each MOS would have been affected in a 
promotion by MOS system, if the Department of Defense guidance for an 80 percent 
promotion opportunity with a variance of 10 percent on either side had been utilized.  The 
reader will note that applying a “relatively similar” promotion opportunity only nets 
eighteen promotion opportunities for the Marine Corps to utilize in structuring the force. 
Table 26 provides the fiscal year 2002 PMOS demographics for the lieutenant 
colonel selection board.  This table illustrates how Marines in these MOSs would have 
been affected, given a promotion by MOS system, if the Department of Defense guidance 
for a 70 percent promotion opportunity with a variance of 10 percent on either side had 
been utilized.  The reader will note that applying a “relatively similar” promotion 
opportunity, means that the Marine Corps would have had to redistribute eighteen 
promotions from Marines who were selected to Marines in MOSs whose promotion rates 
did not meet the promotion opportunity guidance.  Interestingly, seven of those 















MOS Eligible Selected Percent Selected Promotions Gained / Loss 
0180 8 8 100 -1 
0202 29 26 89.7  
0206 3 3 100  
0302 89 87 97.8 -9 
0402 49 47 95.9 -3 
0602 44 42 95.5 -3 
0802 41 39 95.1 -2 
1302 21 20 95.2 -1 
1802 8 7 87.5  
1803 7 5 71.4 +1 
3002 21 21 100 -2 
3404 12 12 100 -2 
4302 5 5 100 -1 
4402 11 9 81.8  
5803 6 5 83.3  
6002 12 11 91.7 -1 
6602 5 5 100 -1 
6604 0 0 0  
7208 16 15 93.8 -1 
7210 8 6 75 +1 
7220 5 5 100 -1 
7509 25 23 92 -1 
7521 0 0 0  
7523 48 36 75 +2 
7525 17 15 88.2  
7543 3 1 33.3 +2 
7556 5 2 40 +2 
7557 13 8 61.5 +2 
7562 67 54 80.6  
7563 21 15 71.4  
7564 9 6 66.7 +1 
7565 42 36 85.7  
7566 30 25 83.3  
7588 9 7 77.8  
 
Table 25.   Fiscal Year 2002 USMC Major Selection Statistics Adjusted to Provide 
“Relatively Similar” Promotion Opportunity. 







MOS Eligible Selected Percent Selected Promotions Gained/ Loss 
0180 11 5 45.5 +2 
0202 18 8 44.4 +3 
0302 72 56 77.8  
0402 34 18 52.9 +3 
0602 29 14 48.3 +4 
0802 31 24 77.4  
1302 10 5 50.0 +1 
1802 9 5 55.6 +1 
1803 2 1 50.0  
3002 22 15 68.2  
3404 11 8 72.7  
4302 1 0 0  
4402 18 13 72.2  
5803 7 4 57.1 +1 
6002 10 5 50 +1 
6602 4 3 75  
7202 16 12 75  
7509 11 7 63.6  
7523 17 13 76.5  
7525 4 3 75.0  
7532 2 2 100  
7543 3 2 66.7  
7557 6 3 50.0 +1 
7562 30 21 70.0  
7563 6 3 50.0 +1 
7564 6 3 50.0 +1 
7565 8 8 100 -2 
7566 13 10 76.9  
7588 9 5 55.6 +1 
  
Table 26.   Fiscal Year 2002 USMC Lieutenant Colonel Selection Statistics Adjusted 
To Provide “Relatively Similar” Promotion Opportunity. 
Source: Major G. Branigan, Officer Promotion Planner, HQMC 
 
The concern, of course, is that even with this small number of adjustments, an 
unfair advantage is created in which a less qualified officer from a short MOS may gain a 
promotion over a better qualified officer from a healthy MOS.  To mitigate this concern, 
the Marine Corps has the option of redefining what it means to have a “qualified officer.”   
The current Marine Corps standard of “best and fully qualified” carries that 
denotation that officers are selected for promotion based on their potential to carry out the 
duties and responsibilities of the next higher grade.186  This definition underscores the 
notion that the duties of a Marine officer are directly tied to his/her rank and not to 
                                                 
186 MCO P1400.31B Marine Corps Promotion Manual, Volume 1, Officer Promotions.  22 Feb 2000. 
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his/her military occupation.  The change to a “best and fully qualified per MOS system,” 
or more appropriately called a “best fitted” system would implicitly mean that the duties 
of a Marine officer are tied to his/her MOS and that the most qualified officer, given 
billet vacancies, is the officer whose level of experience and training best prepares 
him/her to assume the responsibilities of officers that have vacated the grade and billets 
in question. 
The benefit of a promotion by MOS system is that it would be easier to compare 
fitness report evaluations and separate the top performing officers from the average 
performing officers.  Under the current system it is difficult to equate an officer’s 
outstanding performance as an infantry officer with another officer’s outstanding 
performance as a finance officer.  If the records of two supply officers were compared, 
especially by a senior Marine in the supply field, it would be easier to assess what had 
been required of the officer, how he or she performed, and which officer was best 
prepared for the increased responsibilities of the next higher grade.  A promotion by 
MOS system also provides a more balanced approach to meeting all MOS requirements 
by ensuring that the force is grade shaped at every promotion point. 
The cost to the Marine Corps in applying a promotion by MOS system would be 
the perception that the Marine Corps values skill development over leadership 
development.  This cultural concern was a major consideration in the Army’s restructured 
officer management system.  In fact, many Army officers are still worried that the Army 
will eventually lose its war-fighting ethos in place of a “techno-geek” culture dominated 
by specialists. 241  Also recall from chapter four that the Army developed different career 
fields so that officers could concentrate more on their specialized fields and not just on 
being a well-rounded line officer.  Unless the Marine Corps were to decide that certain 
MOSs should be considered specialist fields, it should probably not separate MOSs from 
the line category. 
It is probably clear by this point that the authors do not favor a promotion by 
MOS system.  The long-term benefits of the MOS based promotion system would not 
outweigh the immediate concerns over disparity in promotions, and the negative side 
                                                 
241 Officer Personnel Management System XXI Study, 1997, p. vi. 
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effects of officers becoming too focused on their technical specialties.  To appreciate 
what the authors would recommend, the reader must first understand how value premises 
effect a promotion system. 
B. THE VALUE PREMISE 
One of the most important tenets of any promotion process is its underlying 
objective, which is also referred to as the value premise.  Table 27 shows the value 
premises for the promotion systems of the four military branches: 
 
Marine Corps Navy Army Air Force 
      Equity based on Efficiency based on Efficiency based on Equity based on 
best and fully qualified best and fully qualified best and fully qualified best and fully qualified 
 
Table 27.   Promotion Value Premise Comparison among the Four Services. 
 
The Marine Corps and Air Force promotion systems are considered to be equity 
based because they combine the majority of their officers into one competitive line 
category.  Within that large category, promotions are generally made without regard to 
military occupational specialty, although MOS shortages are addressed in a precept or 
memorandum of instruction (MOI) to the promotion board.  The precepts and MOIs, 
however, have been inconsequential in affecting selection results.  It seems that members 
of promotion boards are against giving special consideration to an officer by virtue of 
his/her MOS, as this practice does not fully uphold the tenets of a best and fully qualified 
model.  The Marine Corps has, in response, strengthened its precept language in the last 
two years and more strongly encouraged the board to give consideration to critically short 
MOSs.  Time is needed, however, to determine the effectiveness of this stronger precept 
language.  
The Navy and Army have promotion systems that emphasize efficiency in 
meeting manpower requirements.  The Army, which has recently divided its unrestricted 
officer competitive category into four career fields, is considered an efficiency-based 
system.  Officers reaching the selection point for promotion to major have their records 
forwarded to a career field designation board where they are assigned a career field based 
upon various criteria, such as demonstrated performance, educational background, 
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technical or unique expertise, military experience or training, in-depth understanding of a 
foreign culture, and consideration of the officer as a whole person.242 When selected into 
one of the fields, the officer continues to be promoted within that career field.   
By creating career field designations, the Army is able to move officers, once 
promoted to major, into occupations with shortages of officers, specific skills, or both.  
This program is similar to the Marine Corps’ 1995 career transition (forced lateral 
moves) program, with the notable exception that the Army’s career field designation 
doesn’t cause a lateral move until the selection point to major, whereas in the Marine 
Corps most lateral moves happened while the officer was either a first lieutenant or a 
junior captain.  The timing of the lateral move is an important issue because of its effect 
on retention.  At the lieutenant or captain level an officer has only made a three to four 
year career investment as opposed to a nine to ten year career investment that a senior 
captain has made upon reaching the selection point to major. 
The Navy is considered an efficiency-based system because of its system of 
eighteen competitive categories in which officers with related education, training, skills, 
and experience are promoted based on requirements, vacancies, and legal limitations.  
The Navy also uses temporary (spot) promotions to advance certain line lieutenants to the 
grade of lieutenant commander under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the 
Navy, when those officers have a skill in which the Navy is critically short and when they 
are serving in a position (billet) designated to be held by a lieutenant commander.  The 
Navy also closely adheres to its promotion board precepts, which address shortages and 
encourages greater consideration of officers in those short fields.   
The Navy has proven that an efficiency based system does not necessarily equate 
to an unfair or inequitable promotion system.  It does seem to equate by definition, 
however, to a system in which shortages can be more quickly addressed.   
The reason that force structuring in the Marine Corps has continually failed over 
the past twenty-five years is that its value premise emphasizes individual needs over 
organizational needs. As evidence, recall that in ALMAR 210-98, then Commandant 
General Krulak ended the forced lateral move program, while noting that many officers                                                  
242 Officer Personnel Management System XXI Study, 1997, pp. 5-4. 
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felt that it contradicted his Commandant’s Planning Guidance which stated “that a sense 
of fairness was key to our manpower processes.” 
Maintaining an equity-based system benefits Marines, but the organization must 
understand that the grade and MOS imbalances will continue in the Marine Corps until 
the value premise is changed.  The manner in which it is changed, however, cannot 
replicate the normal top-down approach to policy making. 
The force structuring solution that manpower planners must implement begins 
with a Corps-wide understanding of the problem that faces the Marine Corps.  Marines 
must fully appreciate the dilemma that planners are confronted with and the options 
available so that they can have viable input for a force structuring option.  The authors 
recommend Marine Corps-wide working groups in conjunction with the annual 
manpower monitors visits to the various commands, so that feedback can be generated 
from the fleet.  The goal is to implement a system that Marines would view as necessary 
and thereby support.  If Marines support the program, the force-structuring battle is 
already won. 
In summary, the authors conclude that based on the statutory considerations, and 
lack of short-run results from transitioning to an MOS based promotion system, it is not 
in the best interest of the Marine Corps to modify its promotion system.  Manpower 
planners should focus their attention on how to best change the value premise of the 
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